

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **The Nature of Governance in Pakistan**

#### **RULES OF THE GAME**

An essential component of the crisis that the Pakistani state has endured through most of its forty four years has been absence of “rules of the game” defining the relations among the ruling classes, between different components of the power structure and among the provinces that constitute the federation of Pakistan. An important reason why such “rules of the game” did not emerge was the frequent experiments with various constitutions and political structures. For instance, the principles which were first enshrined in the 1956 Constitution, seeking a federal parliamentary set up were reversed when the 1962 Constitution imposed a unitary, presidential system of government. This, in turn, collapsed under the 1968-69 mass movement directed against Field Marshal Ayub Khan and the new 1973 Constitution, under Zulfikar All Bhutto, vested tremendous powers in the Prime Minister as part of a federal, parliamentary structure.’ In what was subsequently termed by General Zia-ul-Haq as a bid to “balance” the powers of the President and the Prime Minister, the 8th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution made the Presidency into a powerful authority with the discretion to dismiss the Prime Minister at will, dissolve the National Assembly and appoint the Armed Forces chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

Pakistan, which started off as a federation of five provinces, saw the imposition of One Unit in 1955, with the provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP amalgamated in what was termed as West Pakistan. In 1969, Pakistan’s second Martial Law Regime was quick to undo the One Unit and the provinces were

then restored.

A similar confusion prevailed over the question of Islam in the national polity. Two different strands defined what is an abiding debate: the extent of Islamization of the state structure as opposed to a loose delineation of the role of religion vis-a-vis the constitutional and political structure prevailing in the country. The Father of the Nation, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisaged a Pakistan where religion would have a role in individual and social life but not in the functioning of state institutions. Z.A. Bhutto while amending the Constitution to classify Qadianis as non-Muslims and later passing a law banning alcohol for Muslims under pressure of the religious lobby, nevertheless, held the view that while Pakistan's social ethos could be Islamic, religion need not be extended to all aspects of political life by the state. Conversely, Pakistan's third Martial Law Regime led by General Zia ul-Haq made Islamization the principal plank of polity and used Islam during his eleven-year regime, as the basis of the ruling ideology.<sup>3</sup> A vocal and increasingly influential clergy became a major constituency of the Zia regime. Interestingly, these different perspectives were unable to bridge the dichotomy which Pakistan has manifested in its successive election campaigns (with the exception of the 1990 election): Islamic parties with programmes of Islamization of the country in most cases end up polling lesser votes than those generally termed as "secular" parties. For instance, both during the 1965 election campaign which was contested by Miss Fatima Jinnah (the sister of the Quaid-e-Azam), and the 1988 and 1990 election campaigns in which Miss Benazir Bhutto was a major contestant, the issue of women and their rights to contest and hold political office was confined to a few critics from among the clergy, and it did not elicit an emotive response among Pakistan's highly politically conscious electorate. For the greater part, the people of Pakistan treated this virtually as a non-issue, preferring instead, to cast their ballot on the basis of what they saw were the "real issues".<sup>4</sup>

Probably the single most important expression of the absence of the "rules of the game" in Pakistan's polity resulted, in large part owing to the recurrence of military intervention in Pakistan's

political life. A total of three martial law regimes have ruled Pakistan for twenty-four out of its forty-four years as a sovereign state. Civil military relations have become such a key index of a civil government's stability that two of Pakistan's last three prime ministers lost their jobs because they were unable to function effectively in the absence of an operational balance between army and civil society.<sup>5</sup> This balance could not be attained owing to a number of reasons including encroachment on each other's turf, debate over the defence budget or the desire to trim it, appointment of key military personnel and a certain restiveness among the khaki when in its view, the Mufti leadership had become "too big for its boots". Even in 1991, the single most important question, in the minds of informed Pakistanis was whether the Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, who had succeeded General Zia-ul-Haq in the key slot of Chief of Army Staff and remained virtually a king-maker during two important political transitions in Pakistan, would be retired on schedule or not, He himself had to signal publicly his intention to retire and not to seek extension of his tenure as COAS, only then was he able to set at rest the speculation in this regard.<sup>6</sup>

Compounding these problems pertaining to the constitutional balance between such offices as the Prime Minister and the President and among the provinces as well as civil military relations, is the absence of strong non-governmental institutions. Civil institutions such as the judiciary, the press and intelligentsia have been weak and political parties with grassroots organizations have been absent in Pakistan's political life. Ironically, it was in the eighties under a repressive military regime, that a culture of resistance was able to develop, indigenously and spontaneously, whose essence was a commitment to democracy irrespective of the differences in political orientation. For both civil and military authoritarian governments, a favourite target of systematic assault has been institutions of the judiciary, the press and the intelligentsia. For instance, the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq, all tried, with varying degrees of success, to snuff out the voice of dissent from within the judiciary through selective purges or amendments of the Constitution that deprived

the judiciary of its teeth. The press was controlled through the go monopoly over the issuance of licenses to publish and the distribution of newsprint, whose control eventually became an important part of government leverage over the newspaper industry. Such was the state of the media that by 1979, there were only two major English language newspapers — The Pakistan Times and Dawn — and two major Urdu language newspapers — *fang* and *Nawa-e-Waqt* — in the country.<sup>8</sup>

Universities and institutes of higher learning which provide the institutional base for generating intellectual thinking became the victims of an authoritarian regime whose worst expression was the 1963 Press and Publication Ordinance which enabled the incumbent government to deprive students of their university degrees on political grounds, a legislation without precedent in any civilized country. These assaults on the intelligentsia were reinforced by the recurring purges of dissident teachers and intellectuals from the universities and institutions of higher learning, together with concerted efforts to permit violent student groups working in collusion with the administration to stifle dissent on campus.<sup>9</sup>

Given the politics of personalities that have been prevalent in Pakistan, political parties have invariably revolved around personalities rather than programmes and policies and, in fact, it is the personality which invariably defines a party programme in Pakistan. Additionally, given the feudal nature of Pakistani politics the accent is on dynastic politics with scions of leading families dominating political parties, and by extension, the seats in the legislature of the country. Even Bhutto who won the 1970 elections on an issue-based programme, had, by the time of the 1977 elections, reversed himself politically preferring to patronize the traditional political elites rather than giving strength to new forces such as the urban middle and lower middle classes, who had constituted the social base of the anti-Ayub struggle.<sup>10</sup>

The most damaging feature of the Pakistani political system has been the failure to evolve a democratic political culture based on political co-existence of contending politicians and political parties and tolerance of dissent, which constitute the *sine qua non*

of democracy. The absence of a democratic political culture has tragically manifested itself on key occasions in Pakistan's politics when politicians, preferring to subordinate their larger political interests to petty rivalries and infighting, have sought the army's intervention to oust a political rival rather than to achieve an accommodation with their political opponent. This was the case with Ayub Khan in 1969, when despite his concessions to the political forces on the question of a federal parliamentary structure, politicians like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto preferred to extend support to the group of ambitious army officers who were keen to abort any political settlement between Ayub Khan and the politicians so that they could impose martial law and run the country themselves. Ironically, the chickens came home to roost when Bhutto himself was facing pressure from the political forces opposed to his government in 1977. Despite having reached an accommodation with his political opponents, some politicians like Air Marshal Asghar Khan preferred the option of military rule rather than the continuance of a weakened civil government under Zulfikar All Bhutto which had, by July 1977 agreed to hold fresh elections. Similarly, in April 1979, General Zia-ul-Haq was able to order the hanging of Zulfikar All Bhutto with the tacit concurrence and, in some cases, connivance of most of the major politicians of the country.<sup>11</sup>

### **THE AMERICAN CONNECTION**

From the very beginning, since independence in 1947, the United States has been perceived to be the most significant foreign player in Pakistani politics and probably the most vital element in the formulation of the country's foreign and defense policies. Pakistan's pursuit of a policy of intimacy with the United States was determined by a combination of circumstances, including insecurity generated by fear and distrust of a larger and stronger neighbor India — which in the view of Pakistani policy makers had riot reconciled itself to the existence of the country. The Indian attitude was certainly the initial impulse that determined Pakistan's desire for a close military and political connection with

Washington. This, in turn, was reinforced by the political and ideological proclivities of Pakistan's decision makers whose Westernized ethos was more compatible v the emerging world view of Washington during the height of the Cold War.

This eagerness to seek an embrace with the United States was made conducive on account of a number of elements. There was, at one level, particularly after the death of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, a general weakening of politicians and political forces in Pakistan with a corresponding strengthening of the control of the civil and military bureaucracy. The latter was less responsive to popular aspirations and more at home with the "free world" which promised it generous financial assistance and supply of state-of-the-art military equipment. Consequently the military tended to deepen its dependent relationship with the US. In 1952, when Pakistan sent its first Military Attache to Washington, whose mandate, as conveyed to him by his superiors in Pakistan, was quite clear. Brigadier Ghulam Jilani, the Military Attache, was told by his Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan and the Defense Secretary, Iskandar Mirza, that his main task was to procure military equipment from the Pentagon. In the pursuit of this task, he was told b his superiors, he need not take either the Ambassador or Foreign Office into confidence because, as they put it, "these civilians cannot be trusted with such sensitive matters of national security".<sup>13</sup>

In 1953, the visiting US Vice President, Richard Nixon, se pleased after his meeting with General Ayub Khan. He wrote in his memoirs that General Ayub Khan impressed the visiting American leader as "one Pakistan leader who was more anti-communist than anti-Indian".<sup>14</sup> In later years, it was this dichotomy regarding the compatibility of common feelings on anti-communism with the lack of correspondingly strong concern of the US regarding Pakistan's political and security interests vis-a-vis India, that was to lay the basis of the cleavage between Pakistan and the United States. Ironically, it was the same General Ayub Khan who was instrumental as President in pursuing a policy that brought about this divergence of perceptions between the two countries.<sup>15</sup>

Interestingly, the Pakistan-American connection was initiated at a time when relations with the other superpower — the Soviet Union — had not really started deteriorating. Since the partition of the sub-continent, the Soviets under Stalin had viewed with suspicion both the newly emerging nations of Asia — Pakistan and India. They essentially saw them as countries which were “under the influence of British Imperialism”, although this view was tinged with an initial empathy for the Muslim State of Pakistan, given the fact that their local protege, the Communist Party of India, had in 1942 supported the demand of the Muslim League for self-determination of the Muslims of the sub-continent. Stalin’s coolness to India was also demonstrated by the fact that the first Indian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the sister of the Indian Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru, failed to get even a personal audience with Stalin.<sup>16</sup> It was apparently in pursuit of such a policy, somewhat sympathetic to Pakistan, that the Soviet Union took the initiative of extending an invitation to Prime Minister Liaquat All Khan to visit the Soviet Union. Conversely, the United States had extended an invitation to the Indian Prime Minister to visit Washington. Liaquat Ali Khan initially accepted the invitation to visit Moscow, but later on, he used it to fish for an invitation from the United States and, as a consequence, his visit to the Soviet Union never materialized.<sup>17</sup> Liaquat All Khan’s 1950 visit to the United States set the pace for the growth of Pakistan-American relations and it was not long afterwards that Pakistan was said to be afflicted with a disease called ‘PACTITIS’, which meant that Pakistan was willing and ready to join virtually any Pact that the Americans were sponsoring in the region to counter “communist expansionism”.<sup>18</sup>

The American connection was significant in reshaping Pakistan politics in at least three respects. First, through the supply of arms to the armed forces and in the context of the 1948 conflict, which had already taken place with India, the American connection was able to establish the primacy of the Pakistan Army in the Pakistani power structure. The result was the emergence of General Ayub Khan, the Army Commander-in-Chief, as virtually the “king-maker” in Pakistani politics, a fact recognized and accepted

by the Americans as confirmed in official American reports that have been declassified by the State Department in 1987.<sup>19</sup> It was perhaps no accident that when Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, after dismissing Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin in 1953 and dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954, had in his Cabinet, Ayub Khan. As one of the key members occupying the slot of Defence Minister.<sup>20</sup> Second the American connection established anti-communism as a vital element of Pakistani state policy, both at home and abroad. Soon after Pakistan's entry into a military alliance with the United States in 1954, the Communist Party of Pakistan was banned and its members arrested or harassed. Third, the American connection also laid the basis for creeping authoritarian rule in the country. Soon after the conclusion of the Pakistan - United States military linkage in 1954, for instance, the elected government of the province of East Pakistan which had won the election under the banner of "Jugtu Front", including left wing elements, was quickly dismissed after remaining in office for a few months and the province placed under Governor's Rule.<sup>21</sup>

The Soviet Union, till 1953, had supported the Pakistani stand on the question of Kashmir that there should be a plebiscite Occupied Kashmir under the United Nations auspices to determine the rights and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. Following the initiation of Pakistan's American connection, Moscow switched sides and started taking a strong pro-Indian position on Kashmir. In fact, in 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin, endorsed the Afghan Government's position on what was termed as the "Pakhtoonistan question".<sup>22</sup> Another significant aspect of the American connection was a change in Pakistan's policy from 1956 to 1960 on the question of the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations. Under American prodding, Pakistan started opposing China's admission to the United Nations during that period, although Pakistan had no bilateral problems with its neighbour to the north. A high point in Pakistan-American relations was the famous incident in 1960 when an American spy plane, U-2, which flew from the American air base in Peshawar, was shot down over the Soviet Union and its pilot.

Francis Gary Powers. was captured. This incident was unfortunate for Pakistan not only because Pakistan had been involved as a partisan in the Cold War between the Soviets and the Americans, but also because this incident was an infringement of Pakistan sovereignty as the plane had flown from Peshawar without either prior information or concurrence of the Government of Pakistan.

The American connection, also influenced decision making on foreign policy at the highest levels of the Government of Pakistan. For instance, in September 1954, when the Americans were keen on constructing a new military alliance in South-East Asia to be known as SEATO — South East Asia Treaty Organization, a meeting of the regional Foreign Ministers was called in Manila. Pakistan sent its nominee, Foreign Minister Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, with the express instructions that he should tax sign on any agreement in Manila that envisaged merely assisting a member in the event of “communist aggression” . Pakistan’s primary fear; quite naturally, emanated from possible aggression by India rather than the Soviets or the Chinese. Amazingly, the Foreign Minister flouted the instructions of his government by signing on the dotted line of the draft prepared by the Americans as a result of which SEATO came into existence with no concern for Pakistani sensitivities regarding possible Indian aggression as its thrust was on “communist aggression” alone. From Manila, Sir Zafarullah Khan flew directly to Washington where he sent a long-winded explanation to his government as to why he had signed, despite orders to the contrary. The suspicion in Pakistan that Sir Zafarullah Khan had gone along with the Americans because he had been assured by the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that as a quid pro quo he would be rewarded with the membership of the prestigious International Court of Justice, was reinforced when Sir Zafarullah Khan was later elected to this position, which has a tenure of nine years. He won the election by a margin of one vote, and interestingly, the Israeli delegate, Abba Eban. was absent from the vote on that particular day in the United Nations General Assembly. In February 1955, the Cabinet ratified this decision of Sir Zafarullah Khan on SEATO member-

ship which he had taken in September 1954.<sup>23</sup>

On occasion, Pakistan's intimacy with the United States also coloured the political perceptions of the Pakistani leadership. For instance, during his 1957 visit to the United States, Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was ebullient over the results of his talks with President Eisenhower. His Personal Secretary, Aftab Ahmad Khan, told the Pakistani Political Counsellor at the Embassy in Washington, Agha Shahi, who was later to be Foreign Minister, that "my boss has really performed a miracle. He has managed to wrest a commitment from Eisenhower that Kashmir will be ours". Agha Shahi asked Aftab Ahmad Khan "What will be the quid pro quo?" Replied Suhrawardy's aide: "In return, we will allow the Americans to establish a military base at Badaber, near Peshawar".<sup>24</sup> The base became operational in July, 1959.

There is also a view in Pakistan that Pakistan's first Martial Law, imposed by General Ayub Khan in October 1958, had American blessings. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support this view. Pakistan's first free general elections were scheduled for March, 1959 and it was expected that the Muslim League under Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan would emerge as the winner in the elections. A key plank of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan's foreign policy programme was the establishment of a confederation between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, a sort of nascent Muslim bloc in south west Asia that would be independent of the power bloc created by the respective superpowers.

In March, 1958, a high level Pakistani delegation went to Washington for consultations with US officials under the leadership of Finance Minister Syed Amjad Ali and included the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Air Marshal Asghar Khan. During this visit, the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Ayub Khan, held separate consultations with the Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor. In fact, Syed Amjad Ali recalls that one evening he got an invitation over the telephone for dinner at the Pentagon hosted by General Taylor. When he arrived at the dinner, he was

Surprised to see General Ayub Khan seated at the right of his host, Maxwell Taylor, although he, Syed Amjad Ali, was the leader of the delegation and by virtue of that position and seniority, should have been placed according to protocol on the hosts right side. To top it all, the dinner was capped by a speech by General Taylor who pinned a medal at General Ayub Khan from the United States Army. Later, Oat Ayub Khan sheepishly told Syed Amjad Ali "I never knew General Taylor was going to give me that medal".<sup>25</sup> Six months after this Washington visit, General Ayub Khan launched his military coup in the country, which was the beginning of authoritarian rule and the first of three Martial Laws, that ran Pakistan for twenty-four of its forty-four years as an independent state.

Soon after General Ay Khan became President of Pakistan through his military coup. He was quick to sign a Mutual Security Agreement with the United States in 1959. And in 1961, General Ayub Khan proclaimed in an address to the joint session of the American Congress, the "Pakistan today is the most allied ally of the United States". However, these professions of solidarity wore thin very soon after when, during 1962, even without bothering to consult their "most allied ally" the US airlifted military equipment to India. It was that single event which sparked off a reassessment among policy makers including General Ayub Khan and his Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, for the need of an opening to the People's Republic of China as a counterweight to India.<sup>26</sup> In November, 1963, when Foreign Minister Bhutto went to Washington to represent Pakistan at the funeral of President John Kennedy, the new occupant of the white House, President Lyndon Johnson, told Bhutto what he thought of Pakistan's "growing flirtation" with China which was then a major American obsession in Asia. Lyndon Johnson bluntly told Bhutto; "I do not care what my daughter does with her boy-friend behind my back, but I will be damned if she does something right in front of my own eyes".<sup>27</sup> the message from Washington was that the United States was not going to tolerate Pakistan seeking a relationship with China at a time when the Americans were expending all their energies in Asia to "counter Chinese expansionism".

When the September 1965 war erupted between India and Pakistan on the day the Indians attacked across the international border at Lahore on 6 September it was a beaming American Ambassador who told the Pakistani President with a combination of arrogance and satisfaction that “the Indians have got you by the throat, Mr. President., haven’t they?”<sup>28</sup> A week later, on 13 September 1965, the British daily *The Telegraph* reported that just prior to the war, the American had tried to topple the government of General Ayub Khan through fomenting a coup via one of his close associates, General Azam Khan, but, said the newspaper, “General Azam Khan refused to play ball”. The divergence in Pakistan-American perceptions was apparent when General Ayub Khan traveled to Washington in December 1965 following the end of the war with India and he told Johnson quite plainly “if I break with America, I will simply lose my economy, but if I break with China, I may even lose the country”.<sup>29</sup> In fact, Pakistan’s preference of China over the US was guided by its national interest and was not simply a question of spiting an enemy by befriending his enemy. The culmination of this break on the part of General Ayub Khan with his American friends was his 1967 autobiography, which he appropriately titled *Friends nor Masters*.

By the time General Ayub Khan fell as a consequence of the mass agitation led by Bhutto in February 1969, although the level of intimacy between Islamabad and Washington had attenuated, politically, the Americans retained an importance in the eyes of influential Pakistanis. During the 1970 elections Bhutto contested and won on two issues, namely, socioeconomic change and popular anti-imperialism, including a hard line on India. After winning the election he sent a message to the US through his interview with Peter Hazlehurst of *The Times* (London) in December 1970. He said, “I have done more to block communism in Pakistan than the millions of dollars which the Americans poured in the region”. What he was saying was that the Americans should be doing business with him since he had stolen the thunder from the Left by using their programmes and slogans.<sup>30</sup>

During the 1971 war, the Pakistani military regime badly miscalculated when it tried to trade in its “IOUs” with America on

the question of the opening to China, which Islamabad had expedited, through seeking US support in crushing the insurgency in East Pakistan. Despite being the “most allied ally” of the United States, Pakistan had the dubious distinction of being the first country after World War I to be partitioned with its boundaries altered as a consequence of civil war and external intervention. Bhutto took office in the aftermath of Pakistan’s defeat in the Bangladesh war with India. He too was convinced of the need for an alliance with the US and it was precisely for this reason that he revived the US sponsored CENTO (Central Treaty Organization). During negotiations conducted in Islamabad between the Opposition and the Government to frame a constitution for the country by consensus, it was none other than Sydney Sobers, the US Charged Affaires, who was significant in pushing Pakistani opposition politicians to cooperate with Bhutto.<sup>32</sup> However, Bhutto’s coziness with America proved to be short-lived simply because issues came to the surface that brought about a divergence of interests between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan decision to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France sparked off American concerns regarding Pakistani de signs on the nuclear issue. Soon after this agreement between Pakistan and France in March, 1976, the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, flew into Lahore in August 1976 to hold talks with the Prime Minister on the nuclear issue. He offered a simple deal to Bhutto: scrap the agreement of the nuclear reprocessing plant with France and in return, the Unites States would supply 110 A-7 planes to Pakistan.<sup>33</sup> If Pakistan still refused to relent, then in the memorable words of Henry Kissinger “we will make a horrible example out of Pakistan”. From Lahore, Kissinger flew directly to Paris to put pressure on the French Government to renege on the nuclear issue. Two years later, in September 1978 after a change of government both in Pakistan and the United States, the US finally managed to “convince” the government of President Giscard d’Estaing, to cancel the nuclear processing agreement with Pakistan.<sup>34</sup>

The importance that the United States attached to the nuclear issue in its bilateral relations with Pakistan was evident from the

fact that soon after the July 1977 coup launched by General Zia ul-Haq against Prime Minister Bhutto government the first senior American visitor to Pakistan within the first month of the coup, was none other than President Carter's Science Advisor, Dr. Joseph Nye, who came with the message to Pakistan to cease its nuclear programme. The United States also used the good offices of two Muslim countries who were close friends of Pakistan, to pressurize Pakistan on the nuclear issue. Pakistan was told by Iran and Saudi Arabia that the Americans were "very unhappy" about the pursuit of the nuclear programme and the message to Pakistan from both its Islamic friends was to avoid earning the ire of the United States on this issue.<sup>35</sup>

Even with General Zia, although there was a close relationship with the Americans, the nuclear factor was a recurring irritant in bilateral relations and on two occasions in 1978 and 1987, the United States cut off aid to Pakistan because of alleged Pakistani efforts on the nuclear front. Suspicion between General Zia and the Americans grew to such an extent, (in spite of the collaboration on the Afghan issue), that by 1983, General Zia actually suspected the Americans of maneuvering to oust him from power. In September 1983, after the MRD agitation had emerged as one of the most serious political threats to his regime, the US Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger, arrived in Islamabad for talks with General Zia-ul-Haq. En route to Islamabad he talked to a group of journalists accompanying him and when asked what would be the American attitude should the agitation against General Zia-ul-Haq continue, Weinberger responded in a manner that was bound to send ominous signals to General Zia: "In that event, we will have to look for alternatives". Already, General Zia-ul-Haq had privately confided to a Pakistani editor that "the Americans are behind this agitation because Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi could not have begun it on his own".<sup>36</sup> By the time of General Zia's mysterious air crash in 1988, the gulf between Pakistan and the US had widened. General Zia's agenda on the nuclear issue, Afghanistan and Iran and even on Central Asia, was viewed with suspicion by Washington and he himself was perceived as a political liability.<sup>37</sup>

However, the heyday of the American influence in Pakistan

had yet to come and now the United States worked hard to achieve Pakistan's transition from a pro-American dictatorship to a pm-American democracy in a manner similar to what the US had been able to achieve in the Philippines, South Korea and Panama. After the 16 November 1988 elections in Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto's PPP emerged as the largest party in the National Assembly.

In the midst of the complicated political transition in Pakistan, two important American visitors arrived in Pakistan, namely Assistant Secretary of Defence, Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Murphy. It was under their auspices that a "deal" was brokered between Benazir Bhutto and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. Some of this deal's key elements were:

- retention of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan;
- continuation of Foreign Minister, Sahibzath Yaqub Khan; pursuit of an economic policy devoted to free enterprise and withdrawal of government controls, plus implementing the agreement on the economy signed between IMF and Pakistan on 15 November 1988, that is, just a day before the elections;
- no interference in internal army matters such as postings, transfers, promotions and retirements.

Initially, Benazir Bhutto was given two names — one for Foreign Minister, which she accepted and the other for Finance, which was Dr. Mahboob ul Haq, which she turned down. The latter name she rejected on grounds that Dr. Haq had opposed her father way back in May 1977 when during the PNA agitation he had written a letter to The Washington Post comparing her father with Ugandan military dictator, Idi Amin. It was after this rejection of Dr. Haq as Finance Minister that the Principal Secretary to the President Mr. V.A. Jaffrey, who had extensive experience in economic matters as a bureaucrat, received a telephone call from the American Ambassador Robert Oakley, inviting him to a meal. The luncheon was apparently devoted to economic matters, but the very next day Mr. Jaffrey was surprised to receive a call from

the office of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto telling him that he would be sworn in as Advisor to the Prime Minister on Economic Affairs. When Mr. Jaffrey arrived for his swearing in. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto asked apparently in all innocence Imm amongst those who had gathered for the ceremony, ‘ one of you is Mr. Jaffrey’. Mr. Jaifrey promptly stood up so that the Prime Minister could recognize the person whom she had just nominated as her Advisor on Economic Affairs.<sup>38</sup>

It was during the Benazir Bhutto government that the American Ambassador was labelled with the title of “Viceroy” for his high profile interference in various facets of Pakistani political life.<sup>39</sup> He tried his hand at mediation between the federal government and the opposition IJI government in the Province of Punjab, between the Prime Minister and the provincial government of Baluchistan led by Akbar Bugti. Perhaps precisely for this reason when Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto faced difficulties with President Ghulain Ishaq Khan over the question of the retirement of Admiral Iftikhar Ahmad Sirohey. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, she was said to have personally telephoned President Bush seeking his intervention and Support on this issue.<sup>40</sup> It was ironical that on 6 August 1990 when rumors of an impending dissolution of the National Assembly and dismissal of her government by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan were afoot, Benazir Bhutto sent one of her top aides to the American Embassy to check from Oakley” whether the President had finally decided to dump her.<sup>41</sup> It is, of course, a remarkable coincidence that on both occasions, 29 May 1988 and 6 August 1990, when two different Presidents sacked two different Prime Ministers by dissolving the National Assembly, on both occasions before announcing these fateful decisions, the last visitor to see them was the American Ambassador. Arnold Raphael met General Zia on 29 May 1988 just an hour before he dismissed Junejo and Ambassador Robert Oakley met with Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan about five hours before he announced his decision.. Both the Ambassadors later proclaimed their innocence in this regard and in fact, both were heard complaining that they had not been taken into confidence by the respective Presidents when they were going to

announce these decisions. It is thus no accident that Pakistan's political elite apparently seems convinced that the road to Islamabad lies through Washington.<sup>42</sup>

### **POLITICAL CULTURE**

A saving grace for the country and indeed the source of its resilience, has been the political maturity of the masses and their ability to spontaneously further the political process even under circumstances of adversity when institutions of civil society have been eroded. Such political maturity has been demonstrated on several occasions, at key moments in Pakistan's political history. The tendency of the masses to act spontaneously stem from various sources of motivation. These include the people's Islamic identity, their aspirations for democracy and their strong anti-imperialistic sentiments. On several occasions, the masses have demonstrated their feelings in a manner, which leaves no doubt as to where they stand. Seven such occasions in the last forty-four years are noteworthy and bear testimony to the nation's political maturity. Take the case of the Pakistan Movement, the second major upsurge of Muslim masses in the South Asian sub-continent since the Khilafat movement after the First World War. A party which had proclaimed its goal of a sovereign state for the Muslims in India only in March 1940 was able to attain its objective within seven years due to the indefatigable efforts and single minded determination of one man, the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He was able to lead the Muslim masses, notwithstanding opposition from influential quarters including the British colonial administration, which were keen to quit India leaving a legacy of a unified India, Hindu chauvinists and Nationalist Muslims who were keen to place the Muslim destiny in a united India rather than seeking a separate sovereign state for them. But what was significant was that the Muslims of India reposed their faith in an individual who had, but for his religion and his unwavering commitment to their cause, little in common with them since he neither spoke their language nor followed a lifestyle that was compatible with the overwhelming majority of

the teeming millions of the Muslim masses of South Asia. But the basic fact was clear: Notwithstanding these dichotomies the Muslim masses saw their salvation in the leadership of the Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim League since they were convinced that there was a light at the end of the tunnel, namely, Pakistan.<sup>43</sup>

A similar demonstration of political maturity among Pakistan's masses was evident in 1956 when during the Suez war the Government of Pakistan took a position which was at variance with that of the overwhelming majority of the people and political forces. In that situation, with the people coming out on to the streets to agitate against the government while the government was behaving in a subservient manner toward the West, the popular impulse was guided both by Islamic affinity with Egypt and anti-imperialistic sentiments that condemned the aggression jointly carried out by Israel, France and Britain.<sup>44</sup>

The anti-Ayub movement demonstrated once again that in the eyes of the people, tall claims of "stability, progress and solidarity" did not wash since they were well aware of the fact that the decade long dictatorship had been detrimental to not just their own well-being but the country as well. Ayub Khan had been a strong leader, probably Pakistan's first internationally acclaimed public figure since the Quaid-e-Azam and one whose policy contributed to achieving an impressive growth rate of GNP (although generating growing aid dependence and income inequality), as well as an independent foreign policy. However, after a decade, it was clear that his regime had become a corrupt, self-serving dictatorship governed by the twin instincts of self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Indeed, Ayub Khan had presided over a crucial moment in Pakistan's history namely, the 1965 war with India which has been seen by many as Pakistan's finest hour when almost the entire nation reposed unqualified confidence in his leadership with the popular urge to resist aggression serving to unite among the political forces, the masses and the military throughout the conflict. In the popular view, the confidence which the people had reposed in Ayub Khan's leadership was in contrast to what was generally perceived as a "betrayal" at Tashkent. It was not just a removal of an autocrat through street agitation but

also the unravelling under popular pressure, of an entire system of authoritarian control which had been knit together by Ayub Khan after he had seized power through his coup of 1958.<sup>45</sup>

A similar situation prevailed when, in the views of many, Zulfikar All Bhutto too had betrayed the popular trust and the mandate bestowed upon him in the 1970 elections. A combination of corruption and coercion was corroding the regime of Zulfikar All Bhutto and by 1977, the election campaign and the resultant selective rigging provided an opportunity to the right wing parties to launch a movement against him. Significantly, his erstwhile supporters refrained from countering the street agitation after they felt that his performance in office did not match his earlier promises.<sup>46</sup>

A similar situation was faced by General Zia-ul-Haq when he was confronted with a strong agitation in the province of Sind under the banner of the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). What was more interesting in the context of the Zia regime was the ability of the people to make the fine distinction between their own affinity with Islam and an Islamic identity from General Zia's cosmetic Islamization, whose underlying purpose was to forge his own "Catholic marriage" with power.<sup>47</sup> An apt manifestation of the political maturity of the masses were two events within a three-month span during the regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. In December 1984, General Zia-ul-Haq suddenly announced the holding of a referendum, which, in his view, would be an ingenious way of linking his political legitimacy with Islam. People were asked to respond either in the affirmative or the negative to a single, simple question on whether they wanted an "Islamic System". According to the election procedure if they would answer in the affirmative (as they were expected to since, surely, the people could not vote against an Islamic system!), General Zia-ul-Haq would be deemed to have been elected to a five year term of office as President of Pakistan. Contrary to all official expectations, particularly, General Zia's own, the turnout in the referendum, despite much canvassing, lobbying and persuasion on the part of government functionaries, was a dismal 10-15 per cent or so.<sup>48</sup> General Zia was confident that a structure which

he had personally created and which he thought provided him with a grassroots base could be mobilized to take people out to vote during the referendum. Referring to these institutions as “my army” General Zia told a referendum rally at one of the cities during his campaign that this “army” included 37,000 elected councilors of local bodies, 175,000 Nazimeen-i-Zakat and 180,000 Nazimeen-i-Salat.<sup>49</sup> Conversely, in February 1985, when the same government of General Zia-ul-Haq decided to hold general elections minus the political parties who in fact boycotted these polls, 52 per cent of the population turned out to vote despite the MRD call for a boycott. This ability to distinguish between the farce of the referendum and some semblance of representative rule offered by the election, in which there was enthusiastic participation, testifies to the level of political consciousness and maturity of the masses.

Another event which exemplifies this level of popular maturity are the results of the elections in 1988 and 1990, the former probably the most vicious in Pakistan’s history with all sorts of allegations leveled against Benazir Bhutto. However, the people ignored her gender, ethnicity or sect, and voted her into office because they saw her as a young, but untested political leader wearing the mantle of her father, and who deserved to be given a chance. But when she failed to deliver, during her 20-month rule, the same electorate deserted and ditched her since they felt she had nothing new to offer and unlike Mrs. Indira Gandhi who was returned to her office, Benazir Bhutto was neither filled with remorse nor willing to atone for any of the mistakes and blunders committed by her government).<sup>50</sup> What was significant in the defeat of Benazir Bhutto was not just the collapse of charismatic politics ‘but the fact that it signified an important watershed in Pakistan’s history when, for the first time, one democratic government was replaced by another democratic government. The fairness of these general elections has however been questioned by the Pakistan People’s Party.

Finally, in terms of instances in P history in which the maturity of the masses was demonstrated irrespective of the stand of the political parties or of the government of the day, the most

recent manifestation of this maturity has been the Gulf War in 1991. This even evoked an emotive resonance among Pakistanis, quite unprecedented for a foreign policy issue since the 1956 Suez War, when Pakistanis came out in the streets organizing demonstrations in favour of Nasser of Egypt against the aggression of France, Britain and Israel. In the Gulf war as well, while the official stand of the government of Pakistan was supportive of the multinational forces in which it made a token contribution of 11,000 troops, the popular pulse read otherwise. The reason for these popular sentiments in Pakistan in support of Saddam Hussain and against the US can be analyzed on four counts. First, in the popular perception, the issue was seen as that of a small Muslim state defying the military might of a superpower, a sort of Muslim David facing a Christian Goliath. Second, Pakistanis saw double standards in the attitude of the American led coalition which was prepared to go to war to vacate Kuwait while similar and more longstanding occupations in the region including Israel over Palestine and India over Kashmir, were being ignored. Third, the issue was seen as that of Saddam Hussain becoming the first Arab and Muslim leader to launch a direct attack on Israel in the last forty-two years. Finally, such sentiments among Pakistanis were not surprising, given their instinctive sympathies with the cause of Muslims all over the world. After all, within a ten-year period, Pakistanis resorted twice to demonstrations against US diplomatic installations in Pakistan on account of international Islamic issues. In November 1979 the Mecca Mosque takeover prompted an attack on the American Embassy in Islamabad and in March 1989, the publication in the US of Salman Rushdie's blasphemous book provoked a similar reaction. Equally significantly, in the mindset of most Pakistanis the actual American agenda was not the liberation of Kuwait or Defence of Saudi Arabia but the destruction of the military power of another Muslim country and shifting the balance of power in the Middle East in favour of Israel.<sup>51</sup>

**CRIMINALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS**

One of the features of Pakistani society during the 1980s has been the linkage of geo-political changes with internal unrest. The nexus of drug money, Pakistan's politics and the culture of Kalashnikov developed into a triangle that was a classic combination of internal and external factors.

Three specific events brought out this nexus. The first was the Afghan war in which Pakistan served as a conduit for weapons for the Afghan Mujahideen to the tune of US \$1.2 billion in money from the United States alone over a decade long period. Addition ally, such assistance helped in creating a trained cadre of some 200,000 Afghan Mujahideen, half of them based in Pakistani territory, and the rest operating from inside Afghanistan. Some of the Afghan Mujahideen leaders were equally active participants in the drug trade as a means of financial support.

The second aspect has been the unrest in the province of Sind, particularly after the hanging of Zulflqar Ali Bhutto and the suppression of the PPP with the result that in 1983 a sense of deprivation and alienation made for an explosive mix. In Sind, more than any other province of Pakistan, dacoits and politicians who had been historically linked together, became meshed into a process which was the glorification of crime as a political act, a sort of revolt against the iniquitous status quo. Inside the country, during the 1983 MRD agitation in Sind, the targets of popular wrath were not the ethnic non-Sindhi community which was not harmed at all, rather the focus was on all symbols of state power such as police stations, government build in banks or prisons. Prominent dacoits like Mohib Sheedi, who were killed in an encounter with police, were often glorified and acclaimed in Sind popular folklore. This was largely so because the very act of committing a crime by violating the law of the land, was perceived at the popular level, as an act of defiance, h an action that was to be lauded.

In parts of interior Sind, there have also been unconfirmed reports that the educated unemployed are joining the ranks of

dacoits who offer them monetary compensation and protection in return for “services” rendered. The result is that today a thin line divides crime from politics, a gap that is likely to be bridged further by the gradual collapse of the state machinery in the interior of Sind.

The third aspect of this process, again an offshoot of an external event like the revolution in neighbouring Iran, has been the induction of dissidents, refugees, political activists and even smugglers from Iran, many of whom were accused of criminal acts in their home country. In 1987, for instance, two separate instances bear testimony to these linkages of external factors with the internal unrest in parts of Pakistan. Earlier that year, a dissident Baluch Sirdar from the Iranian province Sistan Baluchistan was killed in an encounter with the Iranian border police. He had been living in exile in Pakistan and was wanted by the government under various violations of the law there. In July 1987, an office of the Iranian opposition group, the Mujahidin-e-Khalq, in Karachi was attacked by a group of Revolutionary guards who had apparently been sent on a mission from Iran. There was an explosion, followed by a gun battle when these Iranian dissidents, based in a Karachi residential area, were attacked by Iranian Revolutionary guards. Given the proximity of Iran-Pakistan ties, the Government of Pakistan chose not to make this issue into a diplomatic tow between the two countries and it was quietly hushed up and the 13 Revolutionary guards were returned to their country without any charges being pressed against them.<sup>54</sup>

Karachi is said to be one of the major exit points for Iranian refugees including political dissidents fleeing their country since the revolution whose number is reckoned to be in the vicinity of 10,000. In June 1991, during joint border talks between senior officials of the province of Baluchistan in Pakistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran which were held in the Iranian city of Zahidan, Pakistan, for the first time, agreed to the Iranian request to extradite those Iranian nationals from Pakistan to Iran who in the view of Tehran were wanted for crimes in their country. This was largely viewed as a measure from Pakistan to appease Iranian sensitivities as well as curbing the activities of those Iranian

refugees in Pakistan who opposed the revolutionary regime in Tehran. Fear of extradition, it was felt, would be conducive to containing the activities of these Iranian dissidents in Pakistan. As far as drug barons go, Pakistan is said to be one of the major points of export of heroin and other drugs into Europe and North America with the Golden Crescent (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) replacing or even matching the Golden Triangle (land, Burma and Laos) in the export of drugs. So far the evidence of linking drug money with politics has been empirically difficult to find, although in a much publicized case during the tenure of Benazir Bhutto in 1989, a prominent drug baron, Haji Iqbal Beg, whose name was mentioned in a BBC television documentary, confessed to supporting prominent politicians of the PPP and UI during the election campaign, a statement that was not contradicted by any of the politicians and according to *The Herald*, Haji Iqbal Beg's contacts with the government were secured through the good offices of a politician of the PPP whom he had financially supported during the elections, namely, the then Speaker of the National Assembly, Malik Miraj Khalid.

During the 1990 elections, one of the eight members of the National Assembly elected from the Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA), was said to be a drug smuggler, although he was sitting in the National Assembly. There have also been allegations against officials of the provincial government in the frontier province, although these remain unsubstantiated. During the tenure of Prime Minister Junejo, Governor of the Frontier Province, Abdul Ghafoor Hon. had to resign from his office when his son was arrested in the United States on charges of drug smug glint

Although the formal influence of criminals and drug smugglers on Pakistan politicians is less apparent at an informal level, with the decline of moral values and the emergence of a crude materialist political culture, the source of funds has become less of an issue than it should have been. The result is an informal nexus where access to big money helps in purchasing political influences and even respectability in society. A key element is the lack of information of the law, since to date no prominent drug

smuggler has ever been convicted in a Pakistani court of law, although since 1989 three drug smugglers have been extradited to the US under American pressure and two have already been convicted in American court of law. The establishment of a separate Ministry of Narcotics Control has not helped to rectify this abysmal state of affairs in a country where drug money is now managing to permeate through different layers of society and politics.

### **THE EMERGING STATE**

As the turbulent decade of the eighties drew to a close, Pakistan's politics were undergoing changes and shifts of a qualitatively new character. In fact, the process of change that began in the eighties in terms of its content and depth was similar to the profound transformations in the 1940s and 1960s. It has almost taken the shape of a generational political cycle of turnover for the inhabitants of this part of the world. The 1940s galvanized the Muslim masses to seek a separate state in South Asia, and launched the Pakistan Movement which eventually changed the political map of the subcontinent. Central to the politics of that period for the Muslims was the question of an Islamic identity and assertion of Muslim nationalism.

Some two decades later, when Pakistan's first military regime had brought forth industrial progress in the country which spawned income inequalities and the creation of an embryonic proletariat, new forces were unleashed which sought radical change through economic salvation. The Bhutto Phenomenon was a product of such a milieu and it shattered the assumptions of the earlier phase of politics which were based on palace intrigues by cliques of vested interests rather than the Bhutto-type mass politics.<sup>55</sup>

During the country's longest Martial Law, qualitative changes took place in national politics. Turmoil in the region plus polarization following the ouster of the Bhutto regime coupled with social phenomena more general to the South Asian region such as increased urban affluence and regionalization of politics. These,

in turn, resulted in new realities in Pakistan's politics. The electorate of Pakistan underwent a change in the last twenty years and so did the issues. Charisma and dynastic politics were unable to substitute for a stand on issues vital for a politically conscious electorate. It is important to understand that the coalition of various forces that brought the PPP to power in 1970 and which was based on an alliance of the urban poor in Punjab, rural poor in Sind plus the rural poor and urban middle class of central Punjab had, by the late eighties, ceased to exist. It was replaced by a broad, ill-defined ideology identifying democracy with resisting domination of the majority province over the smaller provinces and at a national level, to a popular anti-imperialism, which expressed itself in an antipathy to overriding dependence on external factors, particularly the United States.

During this period, Pakistan saw several processes at work which were running concurrently. There was the process of fragmentation of political parties, one expression of which has been the lack of consistency and abiding loyalties and a remarkable ability to quickly switch parties without batting an eyelid. It is thus not surprising that the credibility of the already weak political institutions including political parties has been eroded. At the same time, a parallel politics of sorts developed, marked not by the usual "government versus opposition" but consistent support for issues that appealed to various constituencies. The Left-Right polarization which was an important feature of politics during the 1970 elections was now absent with both the Left and Right lacking credibility.

The affluence that came to Pakistan in the wake of the "Dubai factor" generated greater self-confidence and more initiative among the people. This affluence plus opportunities to travel abroad and to make money also raised popular aspirations for a representative government. After all, in a 15-year period from 1973-1988, approximately US \$ 22 billion flowed into Pakistan as a result of remittances by overseas Pakistanis.<sup>56</sup> Cumulatively, over a period of time, this resulted in a more positive national self-image for Pakistan and its people.

A related fact was that Pakistanis as a whole, (the people as

well as the Establishment), have become more secure about the state of Pakistan and despite the narrow social base of the existing order, politically it is able to let “a hundred flowers bloom.” There is more openness and a greater willingness to tolerate widely differing elements within the political spectrum ranging from SBPF, the MQM, the TNFJ and the ASS to the Communist Party. A reflection of the changing times is that such national figures as Faiz Ahmed Faiz and Abdul Ghaffar Khan were honored, though belatedly, by the Establishment ‘fl state’s capacity for tolerance has certainly grown, particularly with reference to dissent from the officially certified truth. And the dynamism of the people of Pakistan is being channelized in different directions despite institutional decay. Basically, these changes also reflect a process that is sweeping across the entire region, namely that of the unraveling of the post-World War II status quo which was so assiduously nurtured by the victorious powers of the war. In certain countries, as in Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, it has come at a lightning pace and in others including Pakistan and India its pace has been somewhat slower.

Given this altered geo-political and national environment of the eighties, political forces in Pakistan, particularly the MRD, failed to keep pace with such changes. These political forces were unable to grasp and adjust to the “new realities” in Pakistan’s politics. Three basic “new realities” are noteworthy. First, the emergence of the Armed Forces as a political factor willing, ready and able to play a role in national life commensurate with its self- image of being the most important component of the power structure. A “defender of the faith” role for the Armed Forces is a significant aspect of this framework? Secondly, it should have been clear to the political forces that after 4 April 1979 the Armed Forces would not be amenable to a total transfer of power to the civilian politicians. At best, it could be power sharing and that too on “ground rules” which the Armed Forces would set. Finally, the political forces overplayed the importance of the “triple alliance” between the Army, Afghanistan and America. Basically, this alliance was tactical in nature and some of the political forces, particularly the PPP, made the mistake of playing

on the same American wicket as the army had done. That the nature of this alliance was tactical was proven by historical precedents such as the fact that it was, after all, a staunchly pro- American military regime that defied the United States on its China policy twenty-five years ago. And it was an equally staunchly pro-American military regime that resisted American pressure on the nuclear programme. It was therefore, not surprising to see the military trying to take the initiative for a new relationship with Iran in the 1990s, and opposing America during the 1991 Gulf War.

For the future, grasping “new realities”, the political forces will have to struggle to widen the social base of the political system, which is currently knit together by an arrangement of the urban rich and the rural rich. The emergence of a strong middle class, which is assertive as well as politically conscious, has to be reflected in the political system in the 1990s, if it is to retain its representative character.

Three factors have been significant in the evolution of Pakistan as a more confident and self-assured state as it enters the last decade of the twentieth century. These factors are Pakistan’s nuclear capability, the dilution of provincialism through frequent recourse to the ballot-box, a national consensus on democracy, and the emergence of a nascent middle class capable of taking economic and political initiative backed by greater affluence generated in the last two decades. The nuclear capability is viewed in Pakistan as having contributed to the creation of a new balance in South Asia vis-a-vis India. It has also succeeded in generating greater self-confidence in the Pakistan Army and in the Pakistani state. At one level, this is a reflective confidence arising from the fact that India is facing internal crises and instability best illustrated by the emergence of four Prime Ministers within an 18- month period, the uprising in Occupied Kashmir and the separatist movement in East Punjab and Assam. Additionally, in its first foray, outside its borders since Bangladesh in 1971, the Indian army returned badly bruised and battered from Sri Lanka. Conversely, Pakistan felt that its nuclear and missile capability had neutralized to a suitable extent, the awesome Indian superiority

over Pakistan in conventional weapons. Then the Indo-Soviet political and military axis stood shattered with the destabilization of the Soviet Union and the cessation of cold war politics. The Indo-Soviet axis was seen as being central to the defeat of Pakistan in 1971.

Pakistan also felt that it had gained “strategic depth” as a consequence of the events in Afghanistan and the new linkup with Iran. Additionally, for the first time in forty-three years in their bilateral relations, India had sought and received Pakistan’s assistance on a matter that it had all long considered purely “an internal affair”, namely, the situation in Occupied Kashmir. In December 1989, and March 1991, Indian Prime Minister sought Pakistan’s assistance for the release of Dr. Rabia Saeed and Dr. Naheeda Imtiaz respectively, who were held hostage by Kashmiri freedom fighters. Finally, while almost one-third of the Indian army was engaged in quelling an insurgency in Punjab, Kashmir and Assam, the roles seem to have reversed with the Pakistan Army, probably for the first time being freed of the “extra baggage” of running the country under martial law or battling internal unrest. Aggregative, for the first time since Independence in 1947, Pakistanis felt that their country was in a better shape as opposed to India in most respects — politically, economically, psychologically and strategically.<sup>59</sup>

The elections in 1990 in Pakistan were also pointers to political progress in the country. Apart from the fact, that there was a change of government through the ballot box, a first for Pakistan, the elected National Assembly had a sprinkling of three former Prime Ministers and scions of three former Presidents gracing the House. This was certainly an improvement over Pakistan’s political past where Prime Ministers have been hinged or hounded into oblivion. For Pakistani politics, elections in 1990 can be viewed as a political plus on at least three counts. First, with the absence of an American role during the transfer of power in 1990, which was unlike the case in 1988, the revival of the democratic process has meant the weakening of Pakistan’s sovereignty. The second important aspect for Pakistan and democracy after the 1990 elections is that more of the political forces now have a stake in

the electoral process given that the two principal contestants switched sides in government as a consequence of the elections. In that significant respect, the elections contributed more to national integration by bringing into the National Assembly, diverse sections of the political forces having faith in the system. The ballot box is now seen by most political forces as the main mule of political change and attainment of political power. Additionally, the National Assembly is a representative one since personalities including prominent political dissidents, who had returned to Pakistan after many years in exile in Kabul, now sit in the House.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, the 1990 elections helped to bury the politics of “ghosts and graves” which had dominated much of the last decade. Benazir Bhutto did not invoke the name of her late father nor did Nawaz Sharif bank on Zia-ul-Haq during most of the election campaign. Both preferred to concentrate their energies on each other’s track record.

In this emerging Pakistani state, the changing role of two important but somewhat controversial institutions is quite note worthy: the judiciary, and the media.

### **1. The Judiciary**

The judiciary has essentially been a political institution whose role and decisions have had political fallout. The 1953 decision of Justice Munir, upholding the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, contributed more to the weakening of the democratic process in Pakistan than any other single decision in the first decade of the country’s independence. Again, the 1979 Supreme Court decision, (albeit a split one), to convict Zulflqar All Bhutto in the famous murder trial added more to the sense of alienation and deprivation amongst Sind his than any other event.

Pakistan’s judiciary is one of the three institutions of Pakistan which are not just surviving but indeed have strengthened during the last forty-three years. The first, naturally, is the Army, and the other, surprisingly, given the recurrent pressure to conform is the Media which is today showing a zest for enquiry and a commitment to democracy which was rare in the first three decades of an

independent Pakistan. Pakistan's judiciary understandably has had a mixed record, but, on the whole it has acquitted itself well. The judiciary has up to the rule of law, defended civil liberties and contributed to breaking political deadlocks, thereby serving to push the political process forward.

Some of the judiciary's characteristics are noteworthy:

- It is a political institution, whose mental make up is conservative and whose ethos is steeped in the British legal tradition. It has a general tendency to uphold the status quo and not to "rock the boat". Given this makeup, it is inconceivable for brilliant but anti-establishment lawyers to ever occupy a position in the high benches of Pakistan's judiciary.
- As a political institution more often than not, the judiciary reflected "ground realities", including mood of the masses, preferences of the power structure and, when the occasion so demanded, the judiciary's own sense of history.
- More than any other institution in Pakistan, the judiciary has been asked to play a role, with recurring frequency which is above and beyond the call of duty.

What is this role of the judiciary "above and beyond the call of duty"? Often, the judiciary has been asked to adjudicate in disputes amongst politicians (Wali Khan's case in 1975 and the imposition of limited Martial Law in 1977), between politicians and bureaucrats (the 1953 Ghulam Muhammad dissolution decision), politicians and the military (1959 Dosso, 1973 Asma Jilani, 1977 Doctrine of Necessity, and 1988 Haji Saifullah) to set "rules of the game" in politics, as it did in 1988 when it decided against non-party polls. It has also been entrusted to try a former Prime Minister, something which most other judiciaries in the world have probably not encountered. Every enquiry into a major event in Pakistan is held by a judge, every election is sought to be supervised by the judiciary, and the judiciary is also being depended upon to preserve, protect and promote democracy. Some of these are, of c integral to the basic functions of the judiciary, others indicate a failure on the part of Pakistan's politi-

cal leadership to devise “rules of the game” in national politics. Even for the media, the first blow to the despised Press and Publications Ordinance, came not from any government but professions of press freedom were not matched by its practices, but it came from the judiciary when the Shariat Bench dealt some of its provisions “un-Islamic”, a decision which the Zia regime challenged in court. The political importance of the judiciary can be underlined by successive attempts on the part of governments both military and civilian to tamper with its independence. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Fifth Amendment and Zia-ul-Haq’s Provisional Constitutional Order were both directed against the judiciary and in December 1989, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Benazir Bhutto fought one of their toughest battles over the issue of appointing judges to the Supreme Court. For civilian governments in Pakistan seeking to appoint their nominee as Chief Justice is probably politically as significant as the decision to have a nominee of their choice as Chief of the Army Staff.

In popular perception, there is a criticism of the judiciary and its role in certain situations. It is viewed as a status quo institution, which does not go against an incumbent government. The 1959 Supreme Court decision justifying Martial Law, the 1972 Supreme Court decision declaring Martial Law illegal and Yahya Khan an “usurper” (after he was out of office), the 1977 Supreme Court decision on the “Doctrine of Necessity”, and the 1988 Supreme Court ruling against Zia’s dissolution of the National Assembly after his death are cited as examples of the judiciary endorsing the executive’s decisions. Circles close to Mr. Junejo, once privately remarked that the only reason the former Prime Minister did not go to court after his dismissal was his view that the judiciary would not go against General Zia in his lifetime..” In this context, there are aberrations like the May 1977 Lahore High Court’s decision declaring Mr. Bhutto’s limited Martial Law illegal the recent judgment of the Peshawar High Court which restored the NWFP Provincial Assembly and the Provincial Government. Even the 1979 Bhutto murder trial is so controversial that it has not been even once cited as a precedent in any subsequent criminal case. The popular perception viewed the

executive as exercising an overweening influence in this case. Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain, who had served as a Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court when the Bhutto trial began, was treated in a most humiliating manner by the same generals with whom he was so intimately associated till the hanging of Mr. Bhutto. In 1980 after he was kicked “upstairs” to the Supreme Court, Maulvi Mushtaq Hussain had shown his reluctance to leave Lahore, but he was bluntly told that if he did not go voluntarily he would be forced to do so.

During the 1984 Referendum, which is now generally accepted as having been rigged, the “result” was being doctored in the Joint Chief of Staff Headquarters and then transmitted to the Chief Election Commissioner, a Judge of the Supreme Court, who was duly announcing it on the official electronic media. The credibility of the judiciary suffered on this occasion. Matters are not helped when the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court demeans himself in the quest for a job. Justice Hamood-ur-Rehman willingly served as an Advisor with General Zia on Constitutional Affairs with the rank and status of Federal Minister and Justice S.A. Rehman was the Chairman of the National Press Trust, a position normally reserved for a Federal Secretary in Grade 22. And matters are not of course helped by the unfortunate fact that two of Pakistan’s most brilliant lawyers, Manzoor Qadir and A.K. Brohi, in their time, were the best friends of military dictators, rendering them expert legal advice on how best to scuttle the democratic process. However, on the plus side, it is a matter of record that unlike generals, bureaucrats and politicians, no judge has been a party to a military coup or dissolution of parliament. And as compared to most of our politicians who are now becoming corrupt as a group, the judiciary has been relatively clean. And there are more examples of judges with integrity and acting according to their conscience than people of equivalent rank in other institutions. Even today in the political battle between Benazir Bhutto and Pakistan’s Establishment, the outcome rests, in large measure, on the judiciary. The crucial issue whether she is disqualified from Pakistan politics will be taken by the judiciary, which in turn, will have a significant political fallout.

For the future, in terms of the role of the judiciary, two questions are pertinent. Can the judiciary alone act to protect, preserve and promote democracy in Pakistan, despite the continued failure of politicians on both sides of the political divide to seek a *modus vivendi* amongst themselves? The issue is not that of UI or PPP, since the politicians keep trading places. The judiciary is too often being asked to perform a task which is primarily that of politicians. And the other related question for the future is whether the judiciary can remain immune for an indefinite period from the Plot and Pajero Culture” that has now come to permeate Pakistan’s society at all levels with corruption institutionalized from top to bottom.

## **2. The Media**

There are a number of inputs that influence various decisions of any government. These include the government’s priorities and programmes, the interests of those affected by such decisions, the role of political and bureaucratic decision makers, influence of foreign aid donors and, on occasion the media. In this entire situation, the weakest role has been that of the media, because its leverage is intangible, that is, in influencing opinion via the printed words.

Governments in Pakistan are in most part remote and aloof from the people and they generally do not consider themselves accountable to the people. In most cases, the interests of government are limited to preservation of the status quo and self-perpetuation. Given this context, responsiveness to popular needs or popular aspirations is limited. And if there is any responsiveness to the media, indeed, it is selective. This process is further hampered by the fact that, in large measure, the government itself controls the electronic media and a substantial chunk of the print media. As one perceptive observer commenting on the government media has said “government media is like a bikini, what it reveals is suggestive and what it conceals is vital”. Or there is that famous saying about newspapers in Pakistan by the prominent Bengali politician, AK. Fazal-ul-Haq. He said: “Those who read newspapers do not vote and those who vote, do not read the

newspapers”.

In Pakistan, four types of media are relevant in this discussion: electronic media, official print media, independent print media and foreign, namely, Western media. The electronic media comprising the radio and television are entirely owned and controlled by the government. Since they parrot the officially certified truth, they have little or no credibility. The official print media also falls in the same category since it is run by the National Press Trust, established by Ayub Khan in 1964.

The impact that the media has on government decision-making in Pakistan is, therefore, limited to the independent print media or the Western media. Basically, this is limited to editorial analyses, news stories and letters to the Editor’s column. Since the media is seen as a useful vehicle for propaganda and for promoting a positive picture so as to give the “all is well” line, the government is keen that the media hide the truth. The impact of the Western media on the government is far more than that of its own independent print media. That is why the government is always keen that favorable quotes from the foreign journals should be publicized. For example a Time magazine article about the unusual influence on the government and politics by the ISI in which Benazir Bhutto was shown finally to be gradually getting the better of the notorious Intelligence outfit received wide publicity.<sup>62</sup>

In recent years, there are a few instances of how newspapers had an impact on government decision-making. These include:

- The resignation of Ch. Anwar Aziz as Minister for Local Government in the time of Junejo;
- The cancellation of the deal to buy frigates by the Pakistan Navy at a cost of approximately US \$ 1.2 billion;
- stories of drug barons living in hospitals under false pre texts;
- the release of Rasul Bux Palejo;
- campaign against corruption under Benazir Bhutto.
- influencing opinion on foreign policy issues.

These are a few examples of how the media managed to have an impact on government decision-making. There are other instances where, despite the media campaign, the government remained unmoved. These include the decision to establish the FECTO cement plant in Islamabad although it was a pollution hazard through arbitrary alteration of the city's Master Plan. Then there are instances of how officially sponsored campaigns had little impact on popular thinking, particularly under authoritarian regimes. Take, for example, the family planning campaign launched in the 1960s during the days of Ayub Khan or the campaign to motivate a high voter turnout during the 1984 Presidential Referendum. Both failed miserably.

In examining trends in the Pakistani press in the last few years, a couple of basic facts need to be kept in mind. There is, at one level, a linkage between freedom of the press and restoration of democracy. At another level, particularly given the linkage between struggle for a free press and struggle for democracy, the journalistic community is highly political and has played an active role in the political process. The trends in the Pakistani press need to be examined in three broad contexts: the media under Martial Law, the media under democracy and changes of various kinds in the media.

During Martial Law, the media worked under great constraints and compulsions because of the Black Laws in force (like the 1963 Press and Publication Ordinance) which was reinforced by various provisions of Material Law that went against freedom of expression. The media also experienced repression of various kinds including closure of newspapers, arrests of journalists, dismissal of journalists, and the first such instance in Pakistan's history, the lashing of three journalists on political grounds. Forms of censorship varied: till early 1982, there was pie-censor ship which meant that all the subject matter that would be printed in newspapers had to have prior clearance from official censors before it was permitted to be published. This was followed by scholarship under which newspapers themselves had to decide what could be printed with newspaper managements themselves being held accountable. This was complemented by the system of

“Press Advice”. In most cases, it was presumed to be binding and penalties for not ‘accepting the advice’ included a cessation of government advertisement. However, journalists in the print media and electronic media were among the first to promote the culture of resistance, which included other segments of society as well. This was in keeping with the historical role of Pakistani journalism, or at least its substantial sections, to resist authoritarian rule. This political role of journalists, and that too in the opposition, further accentuated the adversarial relationship between the government and the media.

During this period, some major contributions of the media can be cited. First, the media kept the opposition politicians politically alive by publishing news of their activities and statements. This role was important since it gave an impression of political activity and a political process continuing although nothing extensive was happening on the ground. During almost all briefings held for editor journalists by General Zia, the question of holding elections and making the press freer were raised. Second, with the emergence of new newspapers, a transformation took place in terms of the quality of journalists and journalism. The profession of journalism became more respectable and people from an affluent and educated background, particularly young men and women, entered the profession voluntarily. Previously, the profession of journalism was seen as a profession of “drop outs”. This process also expedited a generational turnover in the leadership positions in different newspapers both in the editorial and management sections.

A number of developments have taken place since 1947 which are quite unprecedented in the media in Pakistan. The Press and Publications Ordinance were already abolished in October 1988 for which credit must be given to the post-Zia interim government. What the government of Benazir Bhutto did was to open up the electronic media to the opposition point of view as well, reinstate some of the journalists who were dismissed, remove the stringent provisions of the NOC for travel abroad by journalists and appoint known anti-establishment journalists to the position of Editor in NPT’ newspapers. However, there remained areas of

misuse of official media by the Federal Government particularly in the context of its differences with the Punjab Provincial Government. These included negative television coverage of the then Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif as well as the use of the APP, the official news agency, to disseminate patently false news. However, after a long time if not the first time, the Ministry of Information was playing a low-key, non-interfering role vis-a-vis the independent newspapers. That the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has largely maintained this pattern reflects the fact that the media's hard-won liberties have come to stay. Another new element in the media's role is to function as a forum where political battles are fought given Pakistan's multiple and competing channels of authority (e.g., ISI 1989 stories). There are a number of positive trends at the institutional level in the Pakistani press. These are the pluses of democracy but there is need to guard against possible minuses. Apart from freedom of the press, other pluses pertaining to the trends in the Pakistani press include:

- the technological revolution in printing, particularly the use of color and other high technology;
- readers are now able to exercise a choice in the purchase of newspapers, both in terms of regions and political views. something very healthy;
- working conditions for journalists have improved, with greater choice to join/leave a newspaper as well as higher emoluments. The fact that Pakistan has become important internationally owing to the geopolitical situation has generated tremendous interest in Pakistan and coverage from Pakistan with the result that several international media outlets are available to Pakistani journalists.

Among some of the negative features in the environment in which the press function, we can include:

- the inability of officialdom to cope with criticism since they are used to functioning in the "all is well" mould;
- intolerance is increasing among the political forces and

- there have been instances of attacks/pressures/threats against practically every newspaper and in some cases even journalists have been assaulted by various political, religious or student groups;
- strong, independent editors are threatened by the growing tendency of proprietors to act as Editors which affects the internal independence and professionalism of newspapers.

However, in one respect, there is no change and this pertains to the fact that invariably despite having a larger circulation, the Urdu press has less of an impact and influence than the English press since the ruling elite is essentially Western-educated and English-speaking.

### ***NOTES***

1. The chequered nature of Pakistani political development is assessed in a number of studies from various perspectives including: *Pakistan: The Long View*, edited by Lawrence Ziring, Ralph Braibanti and W. Howard Wriggins, Duke University Press, USA, 1977, especially, its Chapter 9 'Political Leadership and Institution-building under Jinnah, Ayub, and Bhutto' by Khalid Bin Sayeed; *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration* by Rounaq Jahan, Columbia University Press, 1972; *Friends not Masters* by Mohammad Ayub Khan, Oxford University Press, 1967; *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958* by M. Rafique Afzal, National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976.
2. For an informed background on events leading up to the passage of the Eighth Amendment and appraisal of its various clauses, see three-pan series on it in *The Daily News*, by Dr. Safdar Mahmood, "Eighth Amendment Beginning of the Controversy", 14 May 1991, "Passage of the Eighth Amendment Bill", 15 May 1991 and "A Blessing in Disguise?", (16 May 1991); Professor Khurshid Ahmad, *Eighth Constitutional Amendment Bill: A critical appraisal*, Makiaba Mansoor, Lahore, 1985.
3. The Islamization debate in Pakistani politics has been aptly summed up in Anwar Hussain Syed. *Pakistan, Islam and National Solidarity*, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1982,. Muhammad Munir *From Jinnah to Zia*. Vanguard, 1980.
4. Prior to the passage of the Shariat Bill by the National Assembly, the

- Islamic debate was revived in the Pakistani press with a critique of the clergy's role from such sources as: Benazir Bhutto "Shariah Bill and its Impact The News, May 16, 1991, Ghanie Eirabi "The PM has no Mandate to put Clergy in Power", The Muslim 15 May 1991; Israrul Haque four-pan series on "What is Fundamentalism? The Muslim, 10.14,15.16 May 1991); For a different view: Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi "Constitutional issues in the light of Islamic Injunctions", The Ms 8 May 1991.
5. For an mfonnc4 perspective on the debate in civil-military relations see: Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86*, Progressive Publishers, 1988; also Mushahid Hussain "Civil military Relations under Civilian Regimes", The Frontier Post. 23 March 1990.
  6. Mi affirmation of the Chief of Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg in this regard was published in the Nation, 15 May 1991. Underlining that he would retire on schedule and categorically stated that "there is no possibility of Martial Law".
  7. Mushahid Hussain *Judiciary: A Political Profile*, The Frontier Post, 5 October 1990; also "Human Rights and the Judiciary". The Nation, 22 March 1992.
  8. Zamir Niazi, *Press in Chains*, Royal Book Company: Karachi, 1987.
  9. Mushahid Hussain, "University Administration: Tackling Campus Violence", The Frontier Post, 23 August 1987.
  10. Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan's Politics: Nature and Direction of Change*. Praeger Publishers: New York, 1980.
  11. While there is little hard evidence to implicate politicians in conniving with the Army, sufficient circumstantial evidence exists, e.g., Tehrik-i-Istaqlal leader, Air Marshal Asghar Khan's letter to the Services Chiefs, May 1977, asking them to "Not to obey an unconstitutional government"; even recent statements of politicians like the Pir of Pagara "jang", 13 May 1991 and Malik Qasim who bluntly said "all Martial Laws have been imposed in Pakistan with connivance of politicians", The Frontier Post, 15 May 1991.
  12. Studies on Pakistan's foreign policy confirm this perception: SM. Burke, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis*, Oxford University Press, 1975; G.W. Chaudhry, , *India, Bangladesh and Major Po Politics of a Divided Subcontinent*, New York: The Free Press, 1975; MS. Venkatramani. *The American Role in Pakistan 1947-1958*, Vanguard, 1984; Mushahid Hussain. *Pakistan and the Changing Regional Scenario*. Progressive Publishers, 1988.
  13. Major General Gilani himself stated this in his conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
  14. RN: *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon*.

15. Ayub Khan was so disillusioned with the United States that he titled his memoirs *Friends not Masters*, Oxford University Press, 1967.
16. Mushahid Hussain "Pakistan-Soviet Relations 1947-1981" in three parts, *The Muslim*. 13.14 and 16 August 1981; Syed Rifat Hussain "Soviet Response to Pakistan Resolution". *The Frontier Post*. 17 May 1991, quotes the September 1942 Resolution of the Communist Party of India (CPI) saying that "the CPI saying very close to recognizing the legitimacy of the idea of Pakistan and the two-nation theory".
17. The various dimensions of this controversy regarding the Soviet invitation to Liaquat Ali Khan are discussed, among others, in Ayaz Naseem *Pak-Soviet: Relations 1947-65*. Progressive Publishers, 1989.
18. *Supra*. Burke.
19. "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957" Volume VIII South Asia. US Government Printing Office. 1987. P. 436. refers to Ayub Khan as "final arbiter of the destiny of Cabinets".
20. Ayub Khan by his own admission, had prepared a master plan for a Pakistani political system called "A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan" way back on 4 October 1954: Ayub Khan, *op. cit.* p. 187; Khalid Bin Sayeed, *op. cit.* pp. 253-254.
21. The US announced military aid to Pakistan on 25 February 1954. while elections were scheduled for 10 March 1954 and the timing, according to Sidney Seltzberg article in *Commentary* (New York) June 1954 was "to help Prime Minister Mohammad Ali's Moslem League in the elections in East Bengal" in Rafique Afzal. *op. cit.* p. 27; and after the Pakistan-US Military Aid Pact on 19 April 1954. 162 members of the East Pakistan Assembly condemned it while also observing a province-wide protest. Afzal. *op. cit.* pp. 131-132.
22. Mushahid Hussain. *op. cit.* "Pak-Soviet Relations".
23. Agha Hilaly. a Senior Pakistani Foreign Service Officer, who accompanied Sir Zafarullah Khan to Manila and Syed Amjad Ali. former Pakistan Ambassador to the US, confirmed this in conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
24. Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
25. Syed Amjad Ali conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
26. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, "A South Asian View" (Washington. DC: Embassy of Pakistan, 1963) carries the text of the Bhutto interview with Harrison Salisbury of *The New York Times* where he likened Pakistan's opening to China with US wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union.
27. C.L Sulzberger, *A Postscript with a Chinese Accent*, Macmillan, 1974.
28. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, *The First Round: India - Pakistan War 1965*. Taber Publishing House: Lahore, 1979.
29. *Tune*. December 10.1965.
30. Peter Hazelhurst,.. *The Times*, December 1970.

31. Leo Rose & David Sisson. *War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Emergence of Bangladesh*. University of California Press. 1990.
32. Mian Anwar Ali. Intelligence Bureau Chief during the early Bhutto period, in conversation with Mushahid Hussein.
33. Air Chief Zulfikar Ali Khan, Chief of Air Staff wider Bhutto, confided this to Mushahid Hussain.
34. "Documents front Espionage Den" (Tehran 1982) volume on Pakistan has specific details on US-France collusion which led to France unilaterally abrogating the Nuclear Processing Agreement with Pakistan.
35. Agha Shahi conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
36. Mushahid Hussain, "Defining attitude towards In The Nation, 28 April 1991.
37. "Shaheedul Islam Muhammad Zia ul Haq" foreword by Salem Azzam, Indus Thames Publishers, 1990, carries articles by General K.M. Arif which lists "five plausible reasons" for CIA trying to eliminate Zia. P. 37.
38. V.A. Jaffrey conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
39. Mushahid Hussain, "Profiles of Washington's Viceroy's", The Nation.6 August 1989.
40. Lally Weymouth in the Washington Post, August 1989.
41. Mushahid Hussain, "The dissolution: An inside story", The Nation, 8 August 1990.
42. Mushahid Hussein, "May 29 mini coup: The Foreign Policy dimension", The Frontier Post, June 5, 1988.
43. For a full appreciation of the centrality of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Au Jinnah's role in the creation of Pakistan, see: Stanley Wolpert *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press. 1984. especially his tribute to the Quaid in the Preface.
44. Mushahid Hussain, "Gulf War: Impact on Pakistan", The Frontier Posi.3 February 1991.
45. Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan Politics: Nature and Direction of Change", op. cit see Chapter on "Mass Urban Protests".
46. Sayeed, op. cit.
47. Mushahid Hussain, *Pakistan's Politics: The Zia Years*, Progressive Publishers, 1990.
48. No empirically-collected data on turnout exists, only estimates: This figure was cued by an Intelligence Chief in conversation with Mushahid Hussain.
49. Mushahid Hussain, op. cit.. p. 156.
50. Benazir Bhutto even stated that "We were removed because we were to competent" during a party dinner party as which Dr. Akmal Hassan was present.
51. Mushahid Hussain, "Gulf Crisis: Impact on the Muslim World". *Strategic Studies*. Volume XIV. Autumn/Winter 1990-91 Numbers 1 and 2.

52. Ikramul Haq. *Pakistan from hash to heroin* (Alnoor Printer and Publishers, 1991. Lahore) is probably the most comprehensive survey of the contemporary drug scene in Pakistan: Kathy Evans, "Bhutto tells Britain to act against drug uses". *The Guardian*, 12 July 1989.
53. A document circulated in Islamabad on the eve of the 1983 upsurge in Sindh best expressed this deep sense of deprivation among Sindhis. Titled "Statistical self-speaking facts on employment of officers of Sindh (rural), i.e. Old Sindhis in Federal Government 1977 – 1983" pointed, for instance, to only one Sindhi posted out as Ambassador out of a total of 60 Ambassadors.
54. Lt. General Hamid Gul, the Director General, Inter Services Intelligence, personally confirmed to Mushahid Hussain that the government overlooked this episode given the larger interest of Pakistan-Iran relations.
55. The Bhutto Phenomenon is discussed in detail in Anwar Hussain Syed's forthcoming book on the Bhutto years, to be published simultaneously in US, Pakistan and India (Conversation of author with Mushahid Hussain).
56. For implications of the Dubai factor on Pakistan's economy, see: Dr., Akmal Hussain *Strategic Issues in Pakistan's Economic Policy*, Progressive Publishers, 1988.
57. Mushahid Hussain. "Army's Political Role" *the Nation*, September, 16. 1990.
58. General Aslam Beg's "Strategic Defiance", theme was the thrust of his 2 December 1990 and 28 January 1991 speeches, both of which earned American ire.
59. Mushahid Hussain. 1990: *The Year of India's Decline*", *The Nation*, 30 December 1990: An entire issue. January 1991 of *Globe*, Karachi was devoted to this theme: Dr. Naveed Iqbal, "The People of Pakistan are better off", *The Dawn*, 19 April 1991.
60. Mushahid Hussain, "New National Assembly: A Political Profile" *The Frontier Post*, 8 November 1990.
61. Conversation of a highly-placed Junejo confidante with Mushahid Hussain.
62. *Time*, 27 March 1989: the article had several quotable quotes. For instance, "The conductor may have died, but this orchestra plays on" (The reference is to the death of Zia-ul-Haq but the continued influence of ISI). Another, "We have no control over these people (ISI). They are like a government unto themselves". See also the *New York Times*, 23 April 1989: *The Nation*, 26 April 1989: Mushahid Hussain, *Media under Benazir Bhutto*", *Index on Censorship*, June 1989.
63. Mushahid Hussain, *op. cit.*
64. Mushahid Hussain, "New Threat to Press Freedom" *The Nation*, 31 December 1989.