PAKISTAN
PROBLEMS of
GOVERNANCE

Mushahid Hussain
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PAKISTAN
Problems of Governance
South Asia, habitat of over a billion people, is now one of the most difficult regions to govern. Governance means more than maintaining law and order. It involves managing the affairs of the state, especially political, economic and social change. All South Asian governments are now beset with formidable problems of governance.

The Centre for Policy Research, often described as India’s leading Think Tank, has completed a three-year study of problems of governance in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. KONARK is privileged to publish all the five volumes simultaneously in 1993. The authors have had several bilateral discussions with the Director of the Centre for Policy Research, Dr. V.A. Pai Panandiker, and the Project-in-Charge, Prof. Bhabani Sen Gupta. Each author, however, has followed his own track.

1. Bangladesh: Problems of Governance by Prof. Rehman Sobhan, the country’s leading political economist.


3. Nepal: Problems of Governance by Prof. Lok Raj Baral, noted author and an authority on Nepali politics.

4. Pakistan: Problems of Governance by Mushahid Hussain, Pakistan’s noted journalist and Dr. Akmal Hussain, a leading Pakistani political economist.

5. Sri Lanka: Problems of Governance Edited by Prof. K.M. de Silva, Executive Director, international Centre for Ethnic Studies, Sri Lanka and a leading social historian.
PAKISTAN
Problems of Governance

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FOREWORD

This study of problems of governance in Pakistan which we bring with great pleasure to the attention of policy makers and concerned citizens of South Asia, and particularly those in Pakistan, is part of a major project of Centre for Policy Research (CPR) attempting a comprehensive multidisciplinary study of Problems of Governance in South Asian countries. The four other volumes in the series are on Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka.

Together, these five volumes, written by some of the finest analytical minds in South Asia, scholars who have long been concerned with the quality of governance of their respective countries and of the region as a whole, offer perhaps the most comprehensive academic meditation on the ills and evils of our political systems and processes as well as their strong and healthy points. Together, these five volumes are a substantial addition to current political literature on South Asia.

The special value of the Pakistan study lies in the fact that Pakistan is a democracy of very recent vintage. After several discontinuities in its political history and many years of military rule, democratic values and institutions are necessarily fragile. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia also happen to be the only parliamentary democracies among the community of Islamic states. The success of democratic governance in Pakistan will certainly influence the Islamic world in the years to come.

As in the case of the other volumes in the “Problems of Governance” series, the Pakistan volume is written by two outstanding intellectuals of the country, Mr. Mushahid Hussain, former Editor of The Muslim, and Dr. Akmal Hussain, a brilliant political-economist. We congratulate them on the fine work they have done and also extend our thanks to those who helped them
The study of governance problems is, in essence, a search of ways and means of managing the affairs of the state, taking into account the obstacles inherent in changes taking place in South Asian countries. These accumulate from various acts of omission and commission on the part of the rulers, and also result from the increasing complexities of each political society and the international milieu in which these political societies function. From the time of the ancient city state of Athens and the kingdoms and empires that flourished in ancient India, giving benign, good and compassionate government unto the people has been a continuing concern of political gurus or saints concerned with governance. Various schools of thought have contended in this field from the dawn of humankind’s political history. Socrates and Plato held different convictions from Aristotle, father of empirical studies. In our own country, the concept of Dharma has been and continues to be essentially a praxis of good governance. So are Islam and Buddhism with precepts of good governance.

Now at the end of the second millennium of the Christian calendar, we live in a world which is a melting pot of a very large variety of objective and subjective forces. The entire human race is fast coming to its own though at different levels of development. Science and technology press the planet towards a single interwoven universe and at the same time spawn divisive forces. While on the one hand, there are unprecedented opportunities for human development, there are, on the other hand deadly instruments of destruction at all levels of the world, domestic as well as international.

The task of governing diverse, often seething large populations is no longer easy or simple. “A King is history’s slave” declared Tolstoy. In that vein, all governments and their leaders are slaves of the time that loom over and before them.

All the studies in the present series recommend policy pack ages to the rulers to make better government practicable if the necessary will and leadership are available. However, there is no escape from the adage: “People get the government they deserve”. In the first and the last analysis, it is the people who have to
govern themselves and govern well. The tide of history has brought nearly the whole of South Asia under democratic rule. The people now have to seize the opportunities created by history and global change to shake off misrule and misgovernance and lead our societies and civilizations to days of peace, development, justice and reasonable harmony.

I should like to record my sense of gratitude to all scholars and thinkers of South Asia who have participated in the CPR project on problems of governance in South Asia. This project, one may note with a sense of happiness, has created a small community of concerned scholars and men and women of public affairs who are now better equipped to understand and analyse why governments go wrong, and how to bring them back to the right track.

My colleague, Prof. Bhabani Sen Gupa, who is in overall charge of the project, and who has been deeply concerned with South Asian affairs for nearly a decade, deserves a word of special mention. So does the Ford Foundation who funded the project with characteristic total non-intervention in its execution and complete trust and confidence in CPR’s ability to turn out solid and substantive academic and intellectual products. Many senior colleagues in CPR especially Mr. L. P. Singh, Mr. Nirmal Mukarji, Mr. Pran Chopra, Mr. George Verghese and Mr. A. P. Venkateswaran have made their valuable contributions to the success of the project. I thank them all with all my sincerity.

Centre for Policy Research,       V. A. PA PANANDIKER
New Delhi                 Director
PREFACE

This book attempts to examine governance in Pakistan from the perspective of the relationship between the development of state institutions and the decision making styles of key individuals within the power structure. Three military coup d’etats and frequent changes in Constitution have created instability in the relationship between various institutions of the state. At the same time, the personalities of key political leaders, civil servants and military chiefs have contributed to constraining the emergence of a balance between state institutions on the one hand and state and civil society on the other. This study analyses why the rules of the game in the exercise of state power had not been established up to the early 80s and how such rules have begun to evolve over the last six Years.

The book starts with an analysis in Chapter 1 of the economic crisis and the impact of continued poverty, unemployment and regional disparity on the polarization of society. While the task of governance within a polarized polity has become increasingly difficult the ability of the civil bureaucracy and the democratic political system to deal with the crisis has weakened. The consequent change in the balance of power between the bureaucracy and the military on the one hand and the state and civil society on the other is analyzed. In this regard, the actual as opposed to the formal exercise of state power is investigated. In Chapter 2, the changing rules of the game, the nature of political culture and the criminalization of the political process are examined on the basis of hitherto unpublished information and illustrative examples. This is followed in Chapter 3 by an analysis of the power structure with reference to three critical institutions: The Pakistan Army, Intelligence Services and the Civil Bureaucracy. The analysis in Chapter 4 places the exercise of state power in the
context of the relationship between foreign and domestic policies. The American involvement in Pakistan’s politics is analyzed on the basis of new data, the role of the India factor and the influences of the Muslim world on the nature of governance are analyzed. The book ends with a chapter on styles of governance. Here the personalities arid modes of decision making of a number of key leaders are examined, to show how their individual propensities affected the evolution of state institutions.

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CHAPTER-1

THE DYNAMICS OF POWER:
MILITARY, BUREAUCRACY AND THE PEOPLE

INTRODUCTION

The available literature on the nature of state power in Pakistan has essentially examined how the state apparatus came to predominate over the political system.1 Within the state apparatus, the bureaucracy and the military have so far been lumped ‘as co-sharers of the piece of the power cake that has accrued to the ‘state apparatus’ as opposed to the political elites in the civil society. The dynamics between the bureaucracy and the arm, and the changing internal balance of power within the state structure itself have hitherto not been analyzed. It would be useful to examine these dynamics, since the bureaucracy and the military are two quite different institutions. They not only relate in differing ways to the civil society, but in fact, it can be argued, have moved in opposing directions in terms of the nature of internal changes within these two institutions of the state respectively.

This chapter is an attempt at examining the changing balance of power between the bureaucracy and military within the state structure. In Section I, we examine the nature of the crisis that any authority purporting to govern has to confront. In Section II, the intra-institutional changes, as well as the inter-institutional changes with respect to the bureaucracy and military respectively are analyzed. Finally, in Section III the role of the people is examined, as a factor influencing the power structure, in a situation where institutions in the civil society have eroded.
ECONOMIC GROWTH. SOCIAL POLARIZATION AND STATE POWER

The ruling elite at the dawn of independence consisted of an alliance between landlords and the nascent industrial bourgeoisie, backed by the military and the bureaucracy. The nature of the ruling elite conditioned the nature of the economic growth process. However, the latter, in turn, influenced the form in which state power was exercised. Economic growth was of a kind that brought affluence to the few at the expense of the many. The gradual erosion of social infrastructure, endemic poverty and the growing inequality between the regions undermined the civil society and accelerated the trend towards militarization.

In this section we will examine the relationship between an increasingly militarist state structure, and the nature of economic growth.

1. Economic Growth and Social Polarization

While the average annual growth rate of GNP fluctuated during the regimes of Ayub Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto, the overall trend of growing poverty and social and regional inequality continued.

During the Ayub period (1960-1969) the basic objective of the development strategy was to achieve a high growth rate of GNP within the framework of private enterprise supported by government subsidies, tax concessions and import controls. Investment targets were expected to be achieved on the basis of the doctrine of functional inequality. This meant a deliberate transfer of income from the poorer sections of society who were thought to have a low marginal rate of savings, to high income groups who were expected to have a high marginal rate of savings. It was thought that by thus concentrating incomes in the hands of the rich, total domestic savings and hence investment could be raised.

During the decade of the sixties when the above strategy was put into practice, while income was transferred into the hands of the rich, they failed to significantly increase their savings, thereby obliging the government to increase its reliance on foreign aid in
order to meet its ambitious growth targets. The particular growth process in Pakistan during this period generated four fundamental contradictions:

1. A dependent economic structure and growing inflow of foreign loans. (They increased from US $ 373 million between 1950-55 to US $ 2701 million in 1965-70.)

2. An acute concentration of economic power (43 families represented 76.8 per cent of all manufacturing assets by the end of the 1960s).

3. The polarization of classes in the rural sector and a rapid increase in landlessness. For example, while the incomes of the rural elite increased sharply following the “Green Revolution” the real incomes of the rural poor declined in absolute terms. The per capita consumption of food grains of the poorest 65 per cent of Pakistan’s rural population fell from an index of 100 in 1963 to 91 in 1969. Similarly, according to a field survey, 33 per cent of small farmers operating less than 8 acres suffered a deterioration in their diet. During the 1960s as many as 794,042 small farmers became landless labourers.

4. A growing economic disparity between the regions of Pakistan.

These consequences of the economic growth process during the Ayub period generated explosive political tensions which not only overthrew the Ayub government bringing in Yahya Khan’s martial law, but also fuelled the secessionist movement in East Pakistan which ultimately resulted in the formation of Bangladesh.

During the Bhutto period economic growth slowed down sharply. Industrial growth fell from an average of 13 per cent during 1960 to only 3 per cent during the period 1972 to 1977. Similarly, the agricultural growth declined from an average 6.65 per cent in the 1960s to a mere 0.45 per cent in the period 1970 to 1976. At the same time, the nationalization of banks and credit expansion for financing loans to capitalist farmers and industrialists led to heavy deficit financing and an associated increase in the money supply. (Notes in circulation increased from 23 billion rupees in 1971-72 to 57 billion rupees in 1976-77.) The sharp
increase in the money supply during the period of virtual stagnation was reflected in a sharp rise in the inflation rate. (The whole sale price index rose from 150 in 1971 to 289 by 1975.)

It appears that although nationalization of industries and credit expansion enabled the PPP to acquire the support of a section of the urban petit bourgeoisie through the provision of jobs, licences and loans, the available funds were not enough to enrich the entire petit bourgeoisie. In fact, the section of the lower middle class that did not gain from the PPP suffered an absolute decline in their real incomes owing to the high inflation rate. It was this frustrated section of the petit bourgeoisie and the large lumpen proletariat stricken by inflation, that responded to the call for a street agitation in March 1977. Although the apparent form of the street agitation was spontaneous, it was orchestrated and given political focus at key junctures of the movement. This organizational and coordinating function was performed by trained cadres of the Jamaat-i-Islami, allegedly with support from the U.S. The agitation was, of course, fuelled by the fact that the PPP was alleged to have rigged elections in a number of constituencies. The overthrow of the Bhutto regime and the subsequent hanging of the first popularly-elected Prime Minister of Pakistan dramatically represented the limits of populism within a state structure dominated by the military and bureaucracy.

2. The Fragmentation of Civil Society

Each regime that came into power sought to legitimize itself through an explicit ideology: The Ayub regime propounded the ideology of modernization and economic development. The Bhutto regime sought legitimacy in the ideology of redeeming the poor (Food, Clothing and Shelter for all) through socialism. It is an index of Zia’s fear of popular forces, that he initially sought justification of his government precisely in its temporary character. If anything it was the ideology of transience (that he was there for only 90 days for the sole purpose of holding fair elections). It was this fear that impelled the Zia regime to seek (albeit through a legal process the physical elimination of the one individual who could mobilize popular forces. It was the same fear that
subsequently induced Zia to rule on the basis of military terror while propounding a version of Islamic ideology. Draconian measures of military courts, arbitrary arrests and public lashings were introduced. Thus the gradual erosion since Independence of the institutions of civil society, brought the power of the state into stark confrontation with the people. Earlier in 1971, this confrontation had been a major factor in the break-up of Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh. Now a protracted period of Martial Law under the Zia regime served to brutalize and undermine civil society in what remained of Pakistan.

As the Zia regime militarized the state structure, its isolation from the people was matched by its acute external dependence. In the absence of domestic political popularity it sought political, economic and military support from the United States. This pushed Pakistan into becoming a “front line state” in America’s Afghan war which was an important factor in further undermining civil society.

Between 1977 and 1987, with the steady inflow into Pakistan of Afghan refugees and the use of Pakistan as a conduit for aims for the Afghan war, two trends have emerged to fuel the crisis of civil society:

1. A large proportion of weapons meant for the Afghan guerrillas have filtered into the illegal arms market.

2. There has been a rapid growth of the heroin trade. Powerful mafia type syndicates have emerged which operate the production, domestic transportation and export of heroin. Many Afghan refugees who now have a significant share of inter-city overland cargo services have also been integrated into the drug syndicates.

The large illegal arms market and the burgeoning heroin trade have injected both weapons and syndicate organizations into the social life of major urban centres. At the same time, the frequent bombings in the NWFP during the late 1980s resulting from the Afghan war, and the weakening of state authority in parts of rural Sind has undermined for many people confidence in the basic function of the state: That of providing security of life to its citizens. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that an increasing number of people are seeking alternative support
mechanisms in their communities to seek redress against injustice and to achieve security against a physical threat to their persons and families. The proximate identity or group membership through which the individual seeks such security can be an ethnic, sub-religious, sub-nationalist or Biraderi (kinship) group. Thus, civil society has begun to get polarized along vertical lines. Each group, whether ethnic, sub-religious, sub-nationalist or Biraderi, has an intense emotional charge and a high degree of firepower derived from the contemporary arms market.

3. The Crisis of Development

In the context of development, governments in Pakistan are up against a crisis that has four features:

1. Economic growth has been associated with poverty, and in some areas growing poverty. Almost 40 per cent of the people are unable to consume 2100 calories a day per person. There has been impressive GNP growth (5.5 per cent annual growth rate during the Ayub period, 6.5 per cent during the Zia regime, and just over 5 per cent during the brief tenure of the Benazir Bhutto government). Yet, after forty three years, a substantial proportion of the population remains deprived of even the minimum conditions of human existence. As much as 64 per cent of the population does not have access to piped drinking water. (The percentage without ‘safe’ drinking water is probably larger since piped drinking water frequently carries bacteria.) The housing situation is so bad that 81 per cent of the housing units have an average 1.7 rooms which are inhabited by an average of seven persons. Finally, the literacy rate of 28 per cent is amongst the lowest in the world. The standards of those few who make it to college are plummeting at a dizzying pace.

The overall consequence of these features is a growing pressure on a fragile democratic polity. A significant section of the population perceives that there is nothing in this growth process for them, which is a factor in the resurgence of sub-national groups. Consequently, a new conflict may be emerging between centralized state structures and a polarized polity, which is associated with a heightened level of violence in society.
2. The second element in the crisis is the rapid urbanization rate. In Pakistan, it is estimated that at current trends the urban population will double over the next decade, and what is worse, it is likely to be concentrated in large cities. Given the prohibitive cost of providing basic services in large cities, and the financial squeeze on government, a growing proportion of the urban population would be deprived of even minimum civic services. Thus, the percentage of urban population living in unserviced localities (called Katchi Abadis) is expected to increase from 25 per cent today to 65 per cent by the end of this century.” The level of social stress and associated violence may become difficult for any future government to handle. Thus, policies for slowing down the urbanization rate, and increased investments in basic services is an imperative of sustainable development.

3. The third element of the existing development process is rising debt. With existing levels of indebtedness, and government expenditure on unproductive purposes, an attempt to substantially accelerate GNP growth could land Pakistan into an intolerable debt-servicing burden. Latin America can be quoted as an example of what can happen when high growth rates are attempted with high levels of debt. For example, the total debt in just four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) was until recently over US $ 282 billion. Their debt constitutes two-thirds of the outstanding loans of banks to all developing countries. When debt-servicing burdens in Latin America rose, the creditors placed a squeeze, which slowed down GNP growth to a point where real per capita income actually declined in some cases.

In Pakistan, the situation today is not as acute as in Latin America. Yet, debt servicing as a percentage of foreign exchange earnings has touched 25 per cent. An alarmed IMF has placed a credit squeeze, which is already slowing down the GNP growth rate in Pakistan.

4. The fourth feature of the development crisis is the rapid erosion of the natural resource base: The depletion of forests, desertification resulting from soil erosion and salinity, the rising toxicity levels of rivers owing to untreated disposal of industrial
effluents, and also rising levels of air pollution are not only making present life hazardous, but limiting the possibility of getting out of the poverty trap in the future.\textsuperscript{12}

Failure to devise a strategy that could come to grips with this development crisis has been an important factor in social polarization and the resultant difficulty in strengthening democratic institutions, particularly a culture of democracy. The deepening of this economic and social crisis presents a challenge of governance to the three centres of power that purport to govern: The civilian political elite (through parliament and its executive authority), the bureaucracy and the military. One of the factors that may well determine the relative power that each of these protagonists is able to wield may depend on the effectiveness with which it can provide solutions to this crisis. Later on in this volume we will examine how the balance of power within the state structure has shifted from the bureaucracy towards the military.

**INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND STATE POWER**

In recent years the polarization of society along religious, ethnic, communal and regional lines has been accompanied by an under mining of social values through which diverse communities had lived together in a pluralistic society. The social polarization is now fuelled by violence and various forms of banditry which have reached a scale that threatens not only the credibility of political institutions, but raises the question of whether governance based on a centralized state structure is feasible at all. This is a question that confronts not just Pakistan but a number of other South Asian countries.

In South Asia, since the seventeenth century, political centralization and imposition of a state sponsored cultural homogeneity have been imperatives of capital accumulation and the process of appropriation of the economic surplus. Both these inter-related processes require an integrated market within the state and the progressive concentration and centralization of both economic and political power in the hands of the ruling elite.

During the Mughal period, owing to relatively poor communi-
cations and low volume of exports, the autonomy of localized market persisted. The colonial period however, saw the production of a larger surplus as well as its transfer abroad systematically organized by the colonial state. This required a much greater integration and restructuring of the domestic economy for the export of primary goods, and an associated centralized state structure that could manipulate the local elites for the service of metropolitan political and economic interests.

In the post-colonial period, parliamentary models of the Westminster variety were inherited by fragile elites with access to coercive colonial state apparatuses. The process of economic growth initiated by these elites occurred essentially within the framework of private enterprise. The capitalist growth process in the post-colonial period in South Asian countries had the following three characteristics which were to have a profound impact on the relationship between state and civil society:

1. The domestic economy became increasingly integrated with the world capitalist economy through the market mechanism. The structure which these economies had inherited from the colonial period made them essentially exporters of primary commodities. Continued integration with the world capitalist system resulted in large resource transfers to the metropolitan economy. This occurred through declining terms of trade, monopolistic prices of imported technologies, profit repatriation, and debt servicing. Thus, a large part of the fruits of growth in the domestic economy were lost to the metropolitan economy simply through the operation of the market mechanism.

2. Economic growth was predicated on an unequal distribution of productive assets, resulting in growing interpersonal and inter-regional income inequalities.

3. The bottom 40 per cent of the population continued to be deprived of the basic necessities of food, housing, health and education. The state had only a very limited surplus available owing to a narrow tax base and large resource transfer abroad through the market mechanism. Apart from this, its own elite interests prevented an aggressive resource mobilization drive. Consequently, the state has been unable so far to overcome
poverty.

The centralized administrative system inherited from the British Raj, and a political leadership drawn from a narrow social base proved problematic in a society marked by diverse linguistic, ethnic and cultural groups. Under these circumstances, an elitist administrative and political system effectively denied large sections of society any participation in the decisions that affected their economic and social existence.

After four decades of unequal development and in the absence of visible opportunities of redress within existing institutions, the deprived sections of society responded by asserting their ethnic, linguistic and regional identities. Through such an assertion they could use an easily accessible emotive charge to mobilize militancy and thereby exercise political pressure.

Faced with this crisis the ruling elites over the years have been unable to grasp the problem as essentially arising from a failure to either deliver the goods to the poor, or to involve them in economic and political decision making. Rather, the elites have understood the assertion of sub-nationalism as a law and order problem located in the colonial discourse, and have attempted to use selective coercive force in attempting to quell it. Understandably, this response has not only intensified the ‘problem’ but has also allowed a growing importance to the security agencies in the structure of state power itself.

**THE CHANGING INTERNAL BALANCE IN THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER**

The changing relationship between the military and bureaucracy, the two vital elements of the state apparatus in Pakistan, can be understood in the context of three analytically distinct but interactive processes. (These processes were conditioned by the dynamics of Pakistan’s security environment and its foreign policy priorities, particularly the nature of its relationship with the United States):

1. Changes in the internal sociology of the military and bureaucracy associated with changes in the social origins of officers
in these two institutions respectively.

2. Changes in the professional quality of officers and the internal cohesion of the institutions.

3. The balance of power between the state apparatus on the one hand, and the institutions in civil society such as parliament, political parties, media and various fora of public expression, on the other.

We flow examine how these three processes influenced the dynamics within and between the bureaucracy and the military respectively.

Over the last three decades, the social origins of both the bureaucracy and the army have shifted from the landed elite to a wider base in the urban middle strata and the burgeoning class of rural capitalist farmers.\(^\text{13}\) The latter class did include scions of some of the former feudal landlords who had transformed themselves into capitalist farmers following the Green Revolution in the late 1960s, when the HYV made owner cultivation with hired labour an economically attractive venture. However, these capitalist farmers also included many rich peasant families who were able to move up the social scale by reinvesting the increased profits that became available from farming.\(^\text{14}\) While the change in the social origins of the officers in both these institutions has been in the same direction (a broadening of the social base), changes in the level of professional competence and indeed the internal institutional cohesion have moved in opposing directions with respect to the bureaucracy and military respectively.

1. Institutional Decay of the Bureaucracy

During the last forty years, Pakistan’s bureaucracy, has undergone a gradual process of institutional decay. Perhaps the single most important factor in the process has been a sharp decline in the intellectual caliber of the civil servant. This has been primarily caused by the virtual collapse of academic standards at colleges and universities from where prospective candidates for the civil service entrance examination are drawn and the institutional failure to provide them with high quality in-service training. To make matters worse, unlike the 1950s and 1960s, with the decline in
social status and prestige of a civil service job, together with 
opening up of lucrative alternatives in business and other 
professions, it has been observed that the best products of even 
the present poor education system do not normally sit for the 
civil service examination. The structure of the civil service is 
still predicated on the now unfounded assumption that the 
‘intellectual cream’ of society applies for and enters the 
service. Having entered the civil service, the poorly educated 
young officers face a future in which there is an absence of 
rigorous formal education to equip them professionally at each 
stage of their careers for the tasks they are supposed to 
perform.

There are three types of institutions which purport to 
provide a semblance of ‘training’ to the civil servant: The 
Pakistan Academy for Administrative Training which organizes 
courses for each crop of fresh entrants to the civil service; the 
National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) which runs 
courses for officers at the middle stage of their careers (deputy 
secretary level), and the Pakistan Administrative Staff College 
(PASC) which imparts training to senior officers, federal joint 
secretaries and heads of departments. In all three categories of 
institutions, there is a virtual absence of a high quality faculty, 
and reliance is placed almost exclusively on invited speakers 
who lecture and then leave. The courses are so superficial and the 
evaluation of participants so soft as to pose no great intellectual 
challenge even to the current generation of officers with rather 
modest intellectual endowments.

The decline in the intellectual quality of individual 
officers has been accompanied over the last two decades by an 
erosion of Institutional mechanisms of decision making in the 
civil service. Arbitrary interventions of political factions at 
different points in the political power structure interfere in a 
wide range of decisions whether it is transfers, promotions 
and dismissals of officers or judicial decisions by district 
commissioners on land disputes, right up to the issues of the 
arrest of drug barons or approval of major projects. The 
integrity of institutional decision making is often undermined 
by vested interests outside the civil service. This has 
resulted in increasing insecurity, corruption and on occa-
sions demoralization of civil service officers. Such attitudes may have been reinforced by the large scale dismissals of senior officers, sometimes on flimsy charges by successive regimes. For example, Ayub Khan dismissed 1300 civil service officers in 1959 by a single order, again in 1969, 303 were dismissed by General Yahya Khan; during the regime of Z.A. Bhutto, as many as 1400 were dismissed through a single order and again in 1973, 12 senior civil service officers were unceremoniously removed.

At a structural level the CSP (Civil Services of Pakistan) was the elite cadre within the civil bureaucracy and its members inherited the ICS (Indian Civil Service) tradition. The CSP cadre remained dominant in the bureaucracy and indeed over national decision making, right up to the end of the Ayub period. During the subsequent brief regime of General Yahya Khan the dominance of the CSP began to be broken by the military authorities. Subsequently, the regime of Z.A. Bhutto further eroded the internal cohesion and esprit de corps of the CSP by a policy of ‘lateral entry’ into the service. This meant that individuals who were politically loyal to Mr. Bhutto, whether they were from various government departments or outside the bureaucracy altogether, could be appointed in key civil service positions. During the days of General Zia-ul-Haq (later President), the position of the bureaucracy within the structure of state power was rehabilitated, and Zia gave greater confidence to civil servants by putting an end to the practice of ‘screening’ civil servants which during the regimes of General Yahya and Mr. Bhutto was like a sword of Damocles hanging over in-service bureaucrats who could be dismissed or transferred at short notice. General Zia-ul-Haq gave senior bureaucrats relatively long tenures.

In the regime of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto new stresses were placed on the structure of the bureaucracy as a result of the growing political conflict between a PPP government at the centre and the opposition UI government in Punjab, the largest province. The historically unprecedented contention for power between the federal and the Punjab Provincial governments was often done by manipulating individuals or groups of civil servants. The use of bureaucrats as instruments of the political power struggle between
the centre and the province was manifested in a dramatic form in two cases. The first was the Federal Government’s decision to transfer to Islamabad five senior officers working in the Punjab provincial administration. (The I.G. Police, S.P. Police, Information Secretary, The Additional Chief Secretary and the Chief Secretary in the Punjab.) The federal government’s perception was that these officials were misusing their power for the pursuit of the political interests of the provincial government. The Punjab Government initially resisted and then acquiesced in the federal government’s transfer orders for four of the five officers. In the case of the Chief Secretary of the Punjab Government, Mr. Anwer Zahid, the Federal government’s instructions to transfer him to Islamabad were successfully resisted by the then Chief Minister, Punjab (Mr. Nawaz Sharif).

The second case concerned the implementation of the federal government’s People’s Programme for Development (PPD). This programme envisaged providing basic services to the poor at the grassroots level, such as schools, drinking water, brick lined village streets and drains. The federal government which had also provided the funding, attempted to run as a federal government project, a set of development activities which normally fall within the purview of the provincial government. The provincial government decided to resist the implementation of the People’s Programme for Development, on grounds that it was an attack on the authority of the provincial government. This conflict created surrealistic scenes of villagers building village roads and drains with bricks, and the local deputy commissioner sending bulldozers to demolish the construction and arresting the workmen on charges of disturbing the public peace.

The typical civil servant today is faced with formidable problems of poverty, social polarization, breakdown of law and order and erosion of infrastructure. He is expected to tackle these problems in an environment where often conflicting demands from a still nascent political system are impinging upon an administrative institution whose internal stability and cohesion has already been undermined by the arbitrary and piecemeal interventions of successive regimes. To be able to function effectively in such a
situation civil servants would have to be men of considerable professional acumen, integrity and initiative. Few of them today could claim to be imbued with these qualities. Given the poverty of their education and institutional environment, they are in most cases incapable of even comprehending the nature of the problems they face, let alone conceptualize, formulate and evaluate policy interventions to overcome them.

2. Institutional Growth of the Military

While there has been a rapid deterioration in the level of professional competence, institutional procedures for decision making and an absence of effective methods of in-service training in the bureaucracy, by contrast in the case of the military there has been a significant improvement in each of these spheres.

In the military, unlike the civilian bureaucracy, the officer has to study acquire new skills and pass an examination at each stage of the promotion ladder. Over the last forty years the military has developed a sophisticated infrastructure of education from military public schools, through specialized colleges for professional training in various fields of engineering, electronics, and aeronautics, to high quality command and staff training institutions.

The two institutions in the latter category, i.e, Command and Staff College Quetta (for Majors and Lieutenant Colonels), and the National Defence College Rawalpindi (for Brigadiers and above) not only provide training in defence planning and war gaming at the highest international level, but also enable officers to conduct interdisciplinary studies in national policy analysis in the fields of foreign policy, internal security and economic policy. The quality of the teaching staff, the methods of instruction, and the intensity and rigour of the study programmes make them into genuine centres of excellence.

One of the senior instructors at the Command and Staff College, when asked what was the guiding principle of their training programme, replied: “To develop a mind that can think on its own, that does not take anything for granted.” It is ironic that the notion of the critical mind charged by the spirit of enquiry which over the last forty years has been gradually banished from educa-
tional institutions in civil society. Actually constitutes the basis of education in the higher military institutions. The officers study long hours. Use the library intensively, engage in high quality seminar discussions and write policy papers, all activities which are mostly absent from the civilian sphere. it is not surprising that military officers trained at such institutions develop a far more sophisticated understanding of governance than any products of civilian educational institutions in contemporary Pakistan.

Apart from the quality of intellectual training imparted to the military officers, the decision making structure and coordination amongst the various services (Army, Navy, Air Force) have also improved. We have argued that in the bureaucracy, contrary to service rules, there is political interference in promotions, appointments and operational decisions. In sharp contrast to the bureaucracy, the military over the years has not only strengthened and professionalized its internal decision making but has also increasingly insulated itself from involvement of civilian authority at both administrative and operational levels, even in spheres which could be legitimately regarded as the domain of civilian executive authority. For example, the Prime Minister can under the law make appointments. Promotions and transfers up to the tank of Lieutenant General. (The four star Generals or service chiefs are supposed to be appointed by the President.) in 1988, when General Zia-ul-Haq, the then Chief of Army Staff, sent the name of Major General Pir Dad Khan to Prime Minister Junejo for signing the order of promotion to Lieutenant General, Junejo refused on grounds that a General who was responsible for losing Siachin did not deserve to be promoted, and, in fact, suggested to Zia, that Major General Sharmim Alam Khan should be promoted instead. There was a deadlock on the issue, with Zia refusing to withdraw Pir Dad Khan's name. Finally, a compromise was struck and both Major General Pir Dad Khan and Major General Shamim Ajam Khan were promoted to Lieutenant General.

A case that occurred under the public gaze was the famous order by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto to retire Admiral Sirohey. The officer in question who had been promoted to the rank of admiral was appointed Chief of Naval Staff in 1986. Before his
three-year term could end, he was appointed Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC) in 1988. In 1989, the Prime Minister decided to retire Admiral Sirohey on the basis of her view that (i) While the President was the appointing authority for this rank of officer under the Constitution, the Prime Minister had the authority to retire him. (ii) The retirement of Admiral Sirohey became due three years after his appointment as Admiral, that is, in 1989. The President supported by the military took the contrary view that: (i) Admiral Sirohey’s retirement became due not three years after his appointment as Admiral but three years after his appointment as Chairman JCSC, that is, in 1991. (ii) It was the President who was both the appointing and retiring authority.

The contention on the Sirohey issue between the Prime Minister, on the one hand, and President and the military, on the other, became public and was reported in the press. Sirohey did not leave—his post. Finally, the Prime Minister under pressure was obliged to quietly let Sirohey continue in office.

An example of the military achieving institutional insulation from civilian authority in operational matters even in cases where important foreign policy considerations were involved is provided by the Afghan operation. This consisted of providing material support to Afghan Mujahideen more or less autonomously from civilian authority even after the latter had signed the Geneva accord which formally committed the Pakistan government to a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

Thus, the military has become increasingly sophisticated in terms of the quality of its professional expertise, the structure of decision making, and has achieved greater insulation from interventions by civilian authority. At the same time, it has developed a powerful corporate image of itself. The officers owe their privilege, prestige and economic welfare to that organization. Even after they retire they know they will be looked after, given a whole range of military run welfare societies, housing societies and manufacturing units where post-retirement service can be sought. Thus, while morale and esprit de corps has grown rapidly in the army after the 1971 fiasco, the bureaucracy has undergone a gradual decline in its morale over the last three decades.
3. Relations between Military and Bureaucracy

Relations between military and bureaucracy over the last four decades have been determined partly by the differing internal processes of change in the two institutions and partly by pressures emanating from civil society, on the one hand, and the international environment on the other.

There have been four broad phases in relations between the military and bureaucracy:

1. **1951 to 1958.** During this period there was an alliance between the bureaucracy and the army through the “gang of four” consisting of Ghulam Muhammad, Chaudhry Muhammad Au, Iskandar Mirza and General Ayub Khan. The dominance of the bureaucracy supported by the army vis-a-vis the political system can be judged from the fact that in April 1953, the then Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, who was an old bureaucrat, dismissed the Khwaja Nazimuddin government even though the Constituent Assembly had given it a vote of confidence. Soon after this arbitrary dismissal of the government by the Governor-General, the Constituent Assembly met again and passed another vote of confidence, this time in favour of the new Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Boga who had been nominated to this office by the Governor-General. Not only did the Governor-General appoint the new Prime Minister but he also nominated ministers of the cabinet and assigned them their respective portfolios. Thus, state power effectively passed into the hands of the Governor-General and the bureaucracy and military whose interests he pursued. The function of the Constituent Assembly was reduced merely to rubber-stamping his actions.

2. **1958 to 1968.** There was a formal military take over by General Ayub Khan in 1958 (a process that had begun in 1951). Soon after the coup d’etat, Ayub Khan began to constitute a civilian structure of government which was formally established with the introduction of the system of “Basic Democracy”. Under this system the President was to be elected not through direct popular vote but indirectly through an electoral college of individuals called Basic Democrats who, in turn, had been elected through local bodies elections at the village level. Given the structure of political power at the village level which was based
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on clans and biraderis of the landed elite, the composition of the electoral college was overwhelmingly in favour of the interests of landlords and rich peasants. These influential landlords who were instrumental in getting the B.Ds elected had direct links with the bureaucrats. Thus, the B.D. system, in effect, constituted an instrument through which the bureaucracy could have an outreach into the village level clans and biraderis and through which it could maintain the political system of the Ayub regime.

During the Ayub regime there was a power sharing arrangement between the army and bureaucracy, with the bureaucracy being a dominant partner. An important factor explaining why the internal balance of power within the state structure shifted into the hands of the bureaucracy after the military coup of 1958, was that both Ayub Khan and the military behind him recognized the experience and ability of the civil bureaucracy in wielding state power. Equally important was the fact that the bureaucracy at that stage could still boast of highly competent professional administrators inherited from the ICS tradition and an institutional cohesiveness in its decision making structure.

(3) 1971-1977. During the early period of the military regime of General Yahya Khan (1969-1971) the position of the bureaucracy had been relegated to a relatively minor role compared to the military, in the task of governance. The bureaucracy had also been fragmented and demoralized by the dismissal of 303 civil servants. In the subsequent period of the government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto the bureaucracy was further fragmented and demoralized. The new government of Mr. Bhutto carved out from the bureaucracy a personalized chain of command through the appointment of politically loyal individuals in key positions. At the same time, an attempt was made to reduce the power of the elite CSP (Civil Service of Pakistan) cadre of the bureaucracy. This was done first by purging 1300 officers on grounds of misuse of power and filling their vacancies by individuals personally loyal to Mr. Bhutto. These were either drawn from other sections of the civil administration or from outside the bureaucracy, by instituting a system of “lateral entry”. Under this system direct appointments at all levels of the administrative services...
could be made on recommendations from the PPP leadership. By thus short-circuiting the hierarchy of the CSP and penetrating it with officers who were loyal to the PPP, large sections of the bureaucracy were politicized and made amenable for direct use by political forces.

(4) 1977-1988. During this period President General Zia-ul-Haq stabilized and rehabilitated the bureaucracy although it was very much a junior partner to the military in the task of governance. There was a clear demarcation of roles. The military was formulator of the policy and the bureaucracy was made responsible for implementing it. Although General Zia-ul-Haq relied for his power on the military even in the daily running of state affairs (there was a regular meeting of the Corp Commanders and Principal Staff Officers under the Chairmanship of General Zia-ul-Haq in his capacity of Chief of Army Staff, to discuss national policy). Yet, General Zia-ul-Haq maintained three senior bureaucrats as close confidants in the administration. They were Secretary General Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Interior Secretary Roedad Khan and Defence Secretary Ijlai Haider Zaidi. Until his retirement in 1982 Agha Shahi was also an influential bureaucrat on whom General Zia-ul-Haq relied for implementing the foreign policy of what was essentially a military regime.

The history of the changing balance of power between the army and bureaucracy shows a rapid increase in the weightage of the military relative to the bureaucracy in determining national policy in the major spheres of foreign policy, the economy, and internal security. This shift in the internal balance of power within the state structure was due not merely to the weakening of the civil society relative to the state apparatus as a whole but equally importantly due to the institutional deterioration in the bureaucracy as an arm of governance.

THE STRUCTURE OF STATE POWER AND THE PEOPLE OF PAKISTAN

At the time of Independence in 1947 the bureaucracy and the army had a predominant position in the structure of state power
relative to the institutions in civil society. This was due firstly to the form of the freedom struggle on the one hand, and the nature of the Muslim League on the other. Since the freedom struggle was essentially a constitutional one, the state apparatus of the colonial regime remained intact, albeit in a weakened condition. The bureaucracy which constituted the steel frame of the Raj and the army, continued after the emergence of Pakistan to determine the parameters within which political and economic changes were to occur. However, as we have argued earlier, the position of the military relative to the bureaucracy within the power structure became increasingly important, partly because of the different internal dynamics within each of these two institutions of the state apparatus.

The second factor in the failure to subordinate the state apparatus to the political system lay in the two basic characteristics of both the Muslim League before partition and the PPP during the two decades between 1970 and 1990:

1. In the pre-Independence period the Muslim League as well as the Pakistan Peoples Party were movements rather than parties. They were, therefore, unable to establish an organizational structure and develop a political culture on the basis of which the power of the people could be institutionalized and used to subordinate the army and the bureaucracy to a stable political system.

2. The Muslim League in the decade before partition, and the PPP during the early 1970s were taken over by landlords whose political interest lay in constraining the process of political development, and while ruling in the name of the people to confine politics to a struggle for sharing the economic spoils amongst various factions of the political elite.

The political elite in Pakistan has so far demonstrably failed in fulfilling its historical role of building a modern democratic polity marked with social justice within the state of Pakistan, as envisaged by the founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Fulfilling this role would have meant building institutions through which the will of the people could become operative within the power structure, developing a political culture which could strengthen and sustain these institutions, and finally, in
initiating an industrialization process through which the people of Pakistan could make a contribution to the contemporary world. Members of Pakistan’s political elite have in most cases preferred narrow personal gain to national interest, have engaged in internecine quarrels fuelled with greed in situations which required unity and self-sacrifice for the nation state.

Yet, despite the failure of the political elite, the dominance of the military in the structure of state power and growing social polarization, it is remarkable that whenever the people, as a whole, have intervened, they have shown not only a high level of political consciousness but, in fact, it can be argued that their political maturity has grown over time. For example, in 1956 when Western powers were involved in a conflict with Nasser’s Egypt, even though the government and the political elite supported the Western allied powers, the people of Pakistan came out on the streets in large numbers to voice their support for the nationalist struggle of the people of Egypt. Again in 1968, the people of Pakistan expressed their opposition to the regime of Ayub Khan which at the political level had repressed popular aspirations, at the economic level had generated acute inequality between social groups and regions and at the foreign policy level had compromised Pakistan’s national pride in the Tashkent Agreement. After the Pakistan Movement whose struggle for Pakistan resulted in the creation of a new State, the movement against the Ayub regime was the second great movement. It generated demands of social equality, justice and political representation of the dispossessed.

It was Mr. Zulfiqar All Bhutto who articulated the deep seated aspirations of the people during this period, and in a short span of time, he was catapulted into power in 1971. Yet, within six years the people grasped the failure of Prime Minister Bhutto to build a state structure in which power could actually go to citizens at the grassroots; a political system within which the ruling Peoples Party could generate a new leadership at different levels of society, and an economic system in which drastic measures could be taken to alleviate poverty, unemployment, hunger and disease. The disillusionment of the people with their beloved leader was
expressed by their silence when the PNA led an urban revolt to destabilize the regime of Prime Minister Bhutto. However, the enduring contribution of Mr. Bhutto in articulating the aspirations of the poor and in giving a new dignity and pride to the wretched of the earth was acknowledged by the people of Pakistan in the widespread anguish expressed after his judicial assassination. When his daughter Benazir Bhutto took on the mantle of leadership in the struggle against the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, the people once again responded with both passion and heroism. The popular struggle against the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq found its high points first in the 1983 movement and later in the unprecedented demonstration in Lahore on the arrival of Benazir Bhutto in August 1986. Finally, within twenty months of coming into power of the popularly elected Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, when the people once again went to the polls they expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of her regime by voting in favour of IJI.

Thus it is that the people of Pakistan, the poor and downtrodden, in spite of the erosion of institutions of civil society have, nevertheless, demonstrated a high level of political consciousness, and emerged as a factor to be reckoned with by those who pull the levers of power within the state structure. It is for this reason that the military, even when there was no apparent obstacle to the reimposition of military rule, after the death of Zia on 17 August 1988, sought a civilian dispensation within which it could exercise its power as a major (but not the sole) actor, and through which the subterranean tensions of the populace could be defused.

NOTES

10. ibid.
11. For evidence on shortage of basic services, see: Akmal Hussain: “Behind the Veil of Growth”, Chapter in Strategic issues in Pakistan’s Eco Policy, c cit.
13. For evidence on the state of Pakistan’s environment see: Sayyed Engineers Calendar 1991.
15. Akmal Hussain: Changes in Agrarian Structure op. cit